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The literature highlights how climate change might challenge the definitions of wine geographical 
indications (GIs) in Europe. The central issue addressed in this thesis is whether European GI 
viticultural systems could tackle climate change via initiating adaptive institutional change 
processes to relax the constraints imposed by GI production standards. To do so, drawing from 
institutional economics theory and literature on cooperatives and collective brand, we developed a 
novel agent-based model (ABM) representing an abstract GI wine production system in the 
European Union (EU). Using illustrative data, our model allows testing different impact scenarios 
driven by climate change, spatial heterogeneity, and alternative institutional settings (i.e., voting 
mechanism). We used the model to explore individual and collective components of climate 
resilience and the relationship between economic agents and their environment. We compared the 
average output of 100 simulations for each of the 12 different climate-landscape-institution 
scenarios. The inclusion of endogenous institutional change led to considerable variations in all 
target variables, including the emergence of complex/chaotic behaviours. It enabled the system to 
reduce farm exits, increase profitability and collective brand value. We showed how landscape 
heterogeneity has a twofold role in the climate resilience of the system. It increases individual 
adaptability but obstructs collective adaptive capacity through institutional change. The two 
different voting mechanisms considered (i.e., relative and absolute majority) did not produce any 
discernible result. The study highlights the importance of policies oriented to strengthening 
investments in intangibles and facilitating GI rule amendments, especially in sectors where 
cooperatives predominate due to poor intangible investments capability and other issues connected 
to member heterogeneity. 
Keywords: adaptation, agent-based, change, climate change, cooperatives, endogenous, 
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The European Union is the heart of global wine-grape production, hosting 45% of 
the world’s viticultural land for a total of 3.3 million hectares (OIV 2021). In 
Europe, the sector is tightly linked to the concept of terroir (van Leeuwen & Seguin 
2006). Terroir is the unique combination of social-environmental conditions of 
wine’s place of origin (including soil, climate, morphology, and human factors) that 
interact in the co-definition of a wine’s distinctive biochemical features and, 
ultimately, its colour, flavour, and taste. 
In this context, a wine’s name of origin becomes a critical price discriminant, and 
it is posed at the centre of marketing strategies. For this reason, in Europe, terroir 
wines are protected by Geographical Indication (GIs), which are essentially 
intellectual property protection tools in the form of a label. These tools are 
institutions that safeguard producers while setting up several constraints on 
production methods and quality standards (Antonelli & Vigano 2012). Producers 
must respect these standards or else face the withdrawal of the label. 
In the last decades, climate change has had a significant impact on the sector, which 
will likely increase in the future. Recent reviews on climate change impacts and 
adaptation in viticulture can be found in van Leeuwen et al. (2019) and Droulia & 
Charalampopoulos (2021). Importantly for our analysis, climate change is likely to 
mutate traditional wine features all over Europe (better or worse). Micro-climatic 
conditions are fundamental in defining wine quality, and GI recognition depends 
not only on keeping high-quality standards but also specific distinguishable 
organoleptic features. Therefore, if climate changes, other factors must adjust 
accordingly, such as location, varietal selection, viticultural and oenological 
practices. 
European GI wine systems are rural territories with a long viticultural tradition, a 
production structure led by small family businesses and cooperatives (Castriota 
2020 p. 60). Collective decision-making is an essential aspect in these systems, 
given the prevalence of cooperatives and other collective agents such as consortia 
of producers, controlling general marketing of the GI, assuring quality, and 
maintaining production standards (Gori & Alampi Sottini 2014). Moreover, the 
small average farm size and limited individual resources heighten the dependence 
1. Introduction  
12 
 
on collective reputation and territorial brands (i.e., GIs such as Chianti, Burgundy, 
or Pfalz).  
Literature on cooperatives highlights their many weaknesses especially related to 
the imperfect definition of property rights (Chaddad & Cook 2004) and different 
forms of heterogeneity within them, including members’ socio-economic and 
product heterogeneity (Höhler & Kühl 2017). The result is the increasing 
diversification of members interests and poor coordination incentives, which might 
slow down collective decision-making and fuel opportunistic behaviours (e.g., free 
riding). 
Maintaining high-quality standards and creating efficient quality assurance 
mechanisms is the basis for protecting the collective value of the GI, which ensures 
higher returns for all producers and can foster cooperation and environmental 
stewardship (Belletti et al. 2017). On the other hand, GI standards and constraints 
might limit farmers’ adaptability to climatic challenges, possibly exacerbating 
clashes in collective decision-making (Clark & Kerr 2017). 
Nonetheless, managing a GI is a grassroots process, and amendments to production 
rules are allowed. However, it requires cooperation at the local scale and might 
generate complex interactions between individual and collective agents with the 
potential emergence of social dilemmas. For example, low-quality farms would be 
willing to lower the quality standard to maintain the GI label at the expense of the 
quality reputation built by others. Therefore, if local stakeholders can activate 
institutional adaptive and transformative processes (i.e., through rule emendation), 
it remains unclear whether the present nature of local institutions and the 
cooperative structure amongst agents can assure that these processes will take place 
to safeguard the value and resilience of the system. 
In our analysis, we refer to the definition of “specified resilience”, which is: “The 
resilience of what, to what” (Folke et al. 2010), to describe the capacity of the 
system under scrutiny to endure climate change disruptive processes and maintain 
its functions, focusing on profitability, preventing farm exits, and landscape issues.  
Parallel to socio-economic factors, spatial and environmental heterogeneity could 
also curb cooperation through widening the range of climate change impacts. 
Farmers in low areas could be the biggest losers, being the first affected by rising 
temperatures. At the same time, producers in higher areas could suffer less or even 
be better off. In general, diversity is associated with resilience, and single farm 
adaptability might benefit from landscape heterogeneity. However, the diversified 
nature of microclimatic impacts could act as a destabilising factor for collectives 
and hinder cooperation. 
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In a nutshell, due to the primacy of small farms with limited individual resources, 
and the constraining nature of GI rules limiting several climate adaptation practices, 
it is reasonable to assume that institutional change (i.e., changing of common 
production rule/standards), will play a key role in climate adaptation for European 
viticulture. Moreover, the cooperative structure of these systems questions their 
resilience further. Institutional change as the outcome of the collective decision-
making of a large number of small heterogeneous farms might be unpredictable and 
chaotic. On the other hand, the possibly ambiguous effect of spatial and 
environmental heterogeneity on climate resilience increases the system’s 
complexity. 
If successful, institutional change could be one of the few mechanisms available to 
prevent farms from losing higher premia associated with the GI label and exiting 
the business. Moreover, it could strengthen collectives, such as cooperatives and 
consortia, and avoid the decline of the collective brand value. 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) is a methodology particularly suitable to explore 
the issue just described. First, it allows studying the emergence of complex 
phenomena driven by the interaction of autonomous agents and their environment. 
Therefore, with limited assumptions on the system’s underlying principles, and 
only a few simple rules at the individual level, we can explore how multiple agents 
and spatially explicit environmental variables contribute to its definition in a 
bottom-up approach. Second, exploring the impact of possible future climate 
change scenarios in a spatially explicit environment is a well-suited task for a 
dynamic tool such as ABM. Third, when studying institutions and individual 
behaviour in situations where rules are the object of choice (i.e., endogenous 
institutional change), the level of complexity is too high to rely on game-theoretical 
approaches or field experiments (Ostrom 2009 p. 24). With ABM, we can simulate 
a perfectly controlled experimental setting, with numerous interacting automated 
agents, to test the effect of exogenous factors on collective action (Poteete et al. 
2010 pp. 287–290). 
Employing ABM in the analysis of cooperation, collective behaviour, and 
institutional change in agricultural systems is a relevant and still unexplored track, 
at least in Europe (Huber et al. 2018). 
The central issue addressed in this thesis is whether European GI viticultural 
systems could tackle climate change via initiating adaptive institutional change 
processes to relax the constraints imposed by GI production standards. In order to 
do so, we developed a novel agent-based model (ABM) representing an abstract GI 
wine production system in the EU. The novelty of the model stems from farms’ 
ability to engage in endogenous institutional change to amend a quality standard. 
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Thus, the main research question of the present study is: 
How do different institutional (i.e., voting mechanisms) and environmental (i.e., 
spatial heterogeneity) settings influence the climate resilience of wine GI 
production systems? 
The work is not based on hypotheses testing but is exploratory in nature. Using 
illustrative data, our model allows testing different impact scenarios driven by 
climate change, spatial heterogeneity, and alternative voting mechanisms. The 
model allows the consideration of both individual and collective/institutional 
components of climate resilience and the relationship between economic agents and 
their environment.  
The thesis unfolds as follows: in the next section, we present a brief literature 
review focusing on the gap addressed in this research. The most important 
theoretical aspects inspiring the model are covered in section three, with due 
attention to institutions and institutional change. Section four gives a brief 
description of the model following the “Overview, Design concept, Details + 
Decision-making” (ODD+D) protocol1 (Müller et al. 2013). Moreover, we 
complete this methodological section by addressing the experimental design used 
to run the simulations. Section five presents and discusses the most relevant 
findings before we draw conclusive remarks in section six. 
                                                 
1 The full version of the ODD+D protocol can be found in appendix 1.A. 
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Climate impact studies on viticulture constitute a well-established research field. 
Climate change affects viticulture by increasing average growing-season 
temperatures, altering rainfall regimes, and intensifying weather variability. Several 
papers focus on macro-level issues (Mozell & Thach 2014; Wolkovich et al. 2018), 
while others on assessing local socio-economic effects and exploring climate 
change adaptation policies with the use of modelling (Bernetti et al. 2012; Zhu et 
al. 2016; Sacchelli et al. 2017), including ABM (Delay et al. 2015; Tissot et al. 
2017). It is beyond the scope of the thesis to address this field in more detail. 
Instead, given their relevance for the sector, we focus on reviewing the literature on 
cooperatives, highlighting vulnerabilities typical of this organisational structure for 
adapting to challenges. Collective agents such as cooperatives and producers’ 
consortia are essential components of the sector, particularly regarding collective 
brands such as GIs. Finally, we move on to how climate change challenges GIs and 
the role of collective decision making and institutional change as an adaptation 
measure. 
In Europe, particular socio-economic and organisational features may pose 
additional climate adaptation challenges to the wine sector.  First, the sector is 
dominated by small farms, and cooperatives take a significant market share 
(Castriota 2020 p. 60), estimated at around 42% (Bijman et al. 2012). Second, it is 
highly dependent on the concept of terroir, collective brands and GIs, which might 
be threatened by climate change. 
Cooperatives are democratic, non-profit, member-based organisations driven by 
use (Bijman et al. 2014), meaning that their first objective is to support 
members’/users’ incomes. Cooperatives are owned and democratically controlled 
by their members (i.e., one member – one vote). At the same time, profits are 
redistributed based on use/patronage (i.e., the share of deliveries to the cooperative) 
(Chaddad & Cook 2004). In the classic case, members constitute the general 
assembly that elects the board of directors and supervisory board, respectively the 
administrative and control bodies. The board of directors has direct managerial 
power and is monitored by the supervisory board, which reports directly to the 
general assembly. The general assembly has ex-post control on the decision-making 
process, even though control can be enhanced by approving special cooperative by-
2. Literature Review 
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laws. Moreover, the general assembly preserves the rights to make critical decisions 
such as terminations, mergers, by-law amendments, etc. (Bijman et al. 2014). 
Parallel to the tight members’ control, cooperatives exhibit two core 
weaknesses:  first, the one described as ill-defined property rights, and second, they 
present a high level of heterogeneity within members. Property rights are restricted 
to members, non-transferable, non-appreciable and redeemable (Valette et al. 
2018). This ownership and governance structure incentivises free-riding and creates 
two other typical issues in cooperatives, denoted as the horizon and portfolio 
problems. As a result, coops suffer from reduced coordination incentives and low 
capability to attract investments from members (Chaddad & Cook 2004). 
Furthermore, these issues are exacerbated by the heterogeneity of farm size and 
geo/spatial conditions, members’ socio-demographic features, and product 
characteristics, as outlined by Höhler & Kühl (2017). Even though causality might 
be ambiguous, the authors describe how heterogeneity at multiple levels translates 
to poor coordination of members’ interests, leading to high collective decision-
making costs, poor performances, dissatisfaction, and lack of commitment. 
To tackle these institutional challenges, modifications to the traditional cooperative 
model have emerged concerning the ownership structure (Chaddad & Cook 2004) 
and internal governance (Bijman et al. 2014). However, the traditional model is still 
the most common in the EU (Bijman et al. 2014). 
In wine cooperatives, members are small winegrowers delivering grapes to the 
cooperative firm that owns production means and controls the wine-making 
process. In this integrated production framework, delivered grapes are usually 
pooled, and the cooperative has limited control over quality (Santos-Arteaga & 
Schamel 2018). Consequently, delivery-based benefit distribution and the 
decentralised wine-making process result in overproduction incentives and quality 
free-riding (Schamel 2015).  
Nonetheless, wine cooperatives have long survived alongside corporations. Santos-
Arteaga & Schamel (2018) demonstrate how they might achieve higher social 
surpluses when homogeneity of interests between ownership and management units 
exists. Moreover, despite the lower efficiency, wine cooperatives have also proven 
to be more resilient than corporations. Valette et al. (2018) show how cooperatives 
survival rates outclass those of corporations due to their ability to distribute the 
impact of crises among their members. Since they aim at maximising members’ 
income, profits are directed to members’ remuneration. Therefore, lower turnovers 
are directly reflected in lower remunerations, and the cooperative can survive at the 
expense of its members. The authors also point out that the opposite applies in times 
of prosperity, and the practice of redeeming equity to its members reduces the 
coop’s investment capacity. This contradiction makes cooperatives resilient even 
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though they are generally short-sighted in terms of their business horizon (i.e., 
maximising members’ income potential). 
The low investment capability of cooperatives is also reflected in their insufficient 
expenditure in intangibles, primarily related to branding and product 
diversification. Substantial intangible investments are associated with high 
profitability and low risk (Amadieu & Viviani 2011), and wine cooperatives miss 
the opportunity of increasing economic performance and benefits from export 
(Amadieu et al. 2013). Even if Europe’s largest cooperatives aim at product 
differentiation and marketing branded wine, only a minor share succeed, while the 
majority sells bulk wine (Storchmann 2018). The Common Agricultural Policy 
incentivises cooperatives to invest in value-enhancing activities (e.g., marketing, 
quality assurance, and product differentiation). Nevertheless, cooperatives are still 
far behind corporations; one reason why they suffer from reputational discounts 
(i.e., lower prices for comparable quality) and are widely stuck in the low-quality 
segment (Schamel 2015). 
In the EU context, cooperatives are not the only collective agents in the wine sector. 
Producers might also join forces in a consortium to strengthen their collective 
reputation and create a collective brand. Examples of these organisations are the 
“interprofessions” in France and “consorzi di tutela” in Italy. Usually, they 
comprise the GI spatial domain and represent all producers using the collective 
brand (including cooperatives and private firms). These consortia assure producers 
respect the standards defined by the GI and invest in marketing and general regional 
branding (Gori & Alampi Sottini 2014). 
Small private businesses and cooperatives benefit from GI and other forms of 
collective brands due to the limited marketing effort and other internal problems 
afflicting cooperatives (e.g., quality free-riding). Reputation is essential in the wine 
sector since it deals with an experience good, and consumers’ willingness to pay 
(WTP) is based on their quality expectations. Castriota (2020 chap. 6) outlines 
clearly the role of reputation distinguishing three kinds: institutional reputation (i.e., 
merely having a GI label), collective reputation (e.g., the name of a specific 
GI/territory, subarea or producers’ collective), and individual reputation (i.e., firm-
specific based on a private brand). 
Several empirical studies focused on the effect of different forms of reputation on 
wine price, using quality signals of wine guides ratings. Schamel (2009) compares 
the effect of wine ratings on wine prices in several regions in the world, controlling 
both for the effect of collective reputation (i.e., the average of past quality in a 
specific region) and the effect of individual reputation (i.e. if the firm was above or 
below the regional quality). He shows that in most cases, below-average firms 
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benefit from regional reputational spillovers, increasing their premia, while the 
high-quality firms rely less on the regional brand. Quality is important, but it is not 
the only element affecting consumers’ WTP. Beckert et al. (2017) demonstrate how 
other symbolic characteristics of wine can explain wine price differences (e.g., 
artistic components, terroir, regional history). Such characteristics build up the 
symbolic capital of a region and can be communicated to the public by investing in 
marketing and advertising. See Sellers-Rubio et al. (2018, 2021) for an overview 
of advertising and collective wine brands. Finally, belonging to a GI can increase 
WTP for experience goods in other ways. In a theoretical model, Fishman et al. 
(2018) show that a high number of producers in a collective brand increases 
consumers’ WTP since they have more information (reducing uncertainty) about 
past quality than private brands. However, this happens only in strict quality control 
settings, whereas a rising number of producers increase the risk of collective brand 
failure. 
In short, the predominance of small firms and cooperatives with a low capacity of 
investing in private brands makes them highly reliant on collective brands for 
institutional reputation. Also, the weak definition of property rights and 
heterogeneity within cooperatives intensify free-riding incentives and the conflict 
among members’ interests, making it even harder for a coop to establish a solid 
collective reputation and enjoy higher profitability. Finally, the presence of other 
collective agents such as GI consortia increases the complexity of the governance 
structure, raising questions on the effectiveness of the collective management of 
these brands. 
Therefore, we come to the second potential vulnerability of European viticultural 
systems to climate change: the dependence on collective brands and the GI 
institutional system. Climate change threatens the concept of terroir and the 
effectiveness of GI institutions by changing traditional wine features. If quality 
changes, other factors must adapt accordingly to keep using the GI label, such as 
location, viticultural and oenological practices, or vine variety. GI regulations often 
obstruct these adaptation strategies. 
Clark & Kerr (2017) directly address the climate vulnerability of wine GIs, focusing 
on the fussy definition of local climatic attributes, quality features and production 
standards. Moreover, they argue that adaptability is threatened by climate impacts 
heterogeneity at the local scale, possibly obstructing cooperation and sustainable 
innovation. However, at least in other sectors, GIs have proven to be distinctly 
malleable. Amendments to the production standards are possible and frequently 
initiated by local agents. Thus, GIs should perhaps be “conceptualised as evolving 
institutions and not as static protected food production systems”, as Quiñones Ruiz 
et al. (2018) contend. The question now is whether it is possible to describe 
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successful (or unsuccessful) amendment processes and the underlying socio-
economic, ecological and institutional drivers. Both system-internal (e.g., local-
knowledge formation and negotiation processes) and system-external forces (e.g., 
market forces and new varieties) might prompt institutional change in the GI sector 
(Edelmann et al. 2020). 
However, there is a lack of institutional change studies on GI wine systems, and 
more generally, of evidence connecting different systemic features to its 
adaptability (e.g., the incidence of cooperatives and corporations; the governance 
structure, including collective decision-making; environmental and socio-economic 
heterogeneity). Moreover, to the author’s knowledge, the role of institutional 
change in sectoral climate adaptation is yet to be explored. 
In summary, given the dependence on collective GI brands, the ability of local 
systems to adapt to external climatic challenges via a process of endogenous 
institutional change (i.e., GI rule change) is a prerequisite to maintain high quality 
and reputation when faced with the challenge of climate change. The adaptive 
nature of GI rules allows farmers to propose amendments to mutate production 
standards and make GI rules more flexible. However, the presence of several 
collective agents and many heterogeneous individuals does not guarantee the 
success of these processes. Cooperation and collective action are fundamental 
research topics to explore the resilience of agricultural systems, likely even more 
for those based on collective and institutional reputation such as wine GI systems. 
This research project seeks collocation in this research gap, addressing the role of 
endogenous institutional change on climate resilience in a collective group of farms 
acting as a cooperative. We do so by developing a novel agent-based model to study 
the impact of social, institutional, and environmental conditions on the system’s 
overall functions. Employing ABMs in the analysis of cooperation, collective 
behaviour, and endogenous institutional change in agricultural systems is a relevant 
and mostly unexplored topic in the field (Huber et al. 2018). Therefore, this 
research is also a contribution to this field. The following section underlines the 
central theoretical components inspiring and guiding the present study. We focus 
on the definition of institutions and institutional change, and we briefly go over the 




3.1. Institutions and Endogenous Institutional Change 
In the previous sections, we often referred to institutions, rules, and institutional 
change. In the following research, we adopt the institutional perspective provided 
by the work of Elinor Ostrom, with particular attention to her book “Understanding 
Institutional Diversity” (Ostrom 2009). The book provides detailed definitions of 
institutions and formalises a universal framework to analyse institutional diversity 
denoted as Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Notably, this 
research draws on Ostrom’s vertical classification of institutional arenas, enabling 
the analysis of institutional change at multiple levels, her attention to the role of 
institutions in safeguarding the commons (e.g., such as GI’s collective brand value), 
and the interaction between institutions, agents and the environment (e.g., climate 
change impacts). Moreover, it benefits from its examples of different experimental 
settings to study institutions and institutional change, including ABMs. 
Following the IAD framework, individual agents make decisions in an action 
situation defined by exogenous institutional, socio-economic (i.e., attributes of the 
community) and environmental conditions. Individual actions produce personal and 
collective effects, and social dilemmas can emerge in the presence of competing 
outcomes. More specifically, this applies to operational action situations, i.e., those 
producing direct impacts on individuals and their environment. Other types of 
action situations exist and are vertically integrated, each one producing 
rules/institutional constraints for the one below. 
Institutions have the critical role of reshaping agents’ incentives and harmonising 
individual and collective outcomes. Social norms and rules are both institutional 
statements; they alter individual expected outcomes, influencing their decisions and 
the system’s overall efficiency.  
The ADICO syntax can be used to classify different institutional statements. The 
main difference between norms and rules stems from the or else definition and the 
presence of control and punishing authorities (Crawford & Ostrom 1995). Rules 
3. Theoretical Grounding 
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can be classified horizontally based on their aim (i.e., the object of regulation, such 
as action and outcome rules) and vertically based on the level of an action situation 
under analysis. Ostrom distinguishes several nested action situations. The 
operational situation is the one in which agents’ behaviour directly affects real-
world state variables. For example, in our analysis, a group of farmers deciding how 
much to invest in quality before delivering to the cooperative, affecting the final 
wine quality and collective reputation of the system. One level above, the 
“collective-choice” situation, is where a group of individuals act in crafting and 
changing rules (i.e., institutional change) that will affect the operational setting. For 
example, the same winegrowers collectively engaging in setting rules for the 
management of the commons and defining control and punishment mechanisms. 
Ostrom also describes higher levels of “constitutional” and “metaconstitutional” 
situations, which are not considered here, even though they are relevant for, say, 
climate change adaptation strategies at the regional or national level. 
Institutions change due to several causes. Ostrom (2009) identifies depletion of 
resources over time as a primary source of (endogenous) institutional change, which 
instigates the individual to calculate the expected cost and benefit from a change in 
their access to resources. The argument is that when the resources are found in large 
quantities or the economic value of resources is high; actors face low individual 
incentives to create rules to manage the resources. Endogenous changes can make 
the institutions more or less sensitive to environmental changes and play a 
significant role in defining a system’s resilience.  
In our study, winegrowers in a GI region benefit from particular microclimatic 
conditions, granting high wine quality and set quality standards that increase their 
reputation. However, when the climate suitability of the region decreases, standards 
are also questioned, urging for institutional change. 
3.2. Agent-Based models 
When studying institutions and individual behaviour in situations where rules are 
the object of choice (i.e., endogenous institutional change), the level of complexity 
is often too high to rely on game theory and field experiment (Ostrom 2009 p. 24) 
ABMs can provide an effective tool to study complex social-ecological and 
institutional interactions and the emergence of non-linear outcomes (Schulze et al. 
2017). In Poteete et al. (2010 p. 272), an ABM is described as a “computational 
representation” of autonomous agents interacting with each other on a limited level 
(i.e., micro-level), leading to patterns on a macro level. By explicitly defining a few 
agents’ decision-making rules and identifying the conditions in which 
interaction/cooperation may develop, we can test theoretical assumptions and study 
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the emergence of aggregated outcomes in collective decision-making contexts. 
Moreover, ABMs can explicitly include agents’ heterogeneity at multiple levels, 
including state variables, cognitive capacities, preferences, and decision-making 
rules. Agents can derive information from the environment and perceive the state 
of their shared common resource. Based on their objectives/goals and attributes, 
agents decide on their actions affecting the environment and other agents (Poteete 
et al. 2010 p. 288). 
Due to its flexibility, the ability to consider space and agents heterogeneity 
explicitly, ABM is particularly suitable to explore theoretical questions related to 
social-ecological systems, including agricultural ones. In these systems, humans, 
institutions, natural agents, and other abiotic environmental processes are 
connected in complex feedback loops. Schulze et al. (2017) offer a review of 
achievements, issues, and future challenges for ABM applications on social-
ecological systems. Even if ABMs were initially used as theoretical and explorative 
tools, empirical applications aiming to produce policy recommendations have risen 
in the last years. However, much work is needed to include the role of institutions, 
hierarchical interactions and multi-level decision-making (Schulze et al. 2017). 
If ABMs allow capturing the complexity inherent in agricultural production 
systems, it can become extremely complicated to calibrate model parameters or set 
up agents decision-making rules. Sun et al. (2016) highlight the difference between 
complexity (referring to model output) and complicatedness (reflecting a model’s 
construction) of ABMs. While complexity should be high to study complex 
systems’ dynamics, complicatedness must be just enough to fulfil the modelling 
purpose (e.g., theoretical vs empirical) and answer a relevant research question. 
Over a specific limit, increasing model complicatedness does not increase its 
explanatory power while carrying several disadvantages in terms of results’ 
interpretation, and model clarity and usability. 
An insightful comparison between theoretical and empirical ABMs is given in 
Taghikhah et al. (2021). Empirical models, in which theoretical assumptions are 
relaxed by the empirical calibration of models’ parameters, have a greater capacity 
for explaining site-specific dynamics. On the other hand, theoretical models, based 
on secondary data and the application of theoretical rules, can perform almost as 
well as the empirical counterpart in the study region while conserving higher 
adaptability to different contexts. 
Few ABMs implement endogenous institutional change, while in Europe’s 
agricultural economics landscape, there seems to be no example of such (Huber et 
al. 2018). Smajgl et al. (2008) present a conceptual framework enabling agents to 
develop new actions, including the proposition of new rules. Essential in this 
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process is to enable agents to infer relationships between different environmental 
conditions, individual actions, and outcomes. Finally, capturing externalities 
caused by other individuals is another crucial aspect to consider when modelling 
endogenous institutional change. 
In our model, we look at institutional change as the endogenous grassroots rule 
changing process. Given what has been said on institutions, the process is guided 
by changes in single agents’ perceptions of their environment and exogenous 
collective-choice rules (i.e., voting mechanisms), defining the framework in which 
agents can change operational rules. Farm agents act in both operational 
(viticultural-wine making activities) and collective-choice situations. In the latter, 
they vote to change the “aim” of a GI quality standard, which can be defined as an 
outcome operational rule in Ostrom’s terms. 
3.3. Climate Resilience 
In the analysis of climatic impacts and farms’ adaptation processes in the 
operational and collective-choice situations, we often refer to the concept of 
resilience. We adopt the definition given by the literature on adaptive cycles and 
social-ecological systems. Resilience is the capacity of a system to endure 
disruptions, maintain its functions and equilibrium state. This goes beyond the idea 
of mere conservation of the original system equilibrium and embraces three major 
components: robustness, adaptability, and transformability (Folke et al. 2010). 
Due to the constrained scope of a master’s thesis, we focus on the definition of 
“specified resilience”, which is: “The resilience of what, to what” (Folke et al. 
2010). Indeed, the main goal is to build a model with the potential of assessing the 
resilience of a typical European viticultural system to the specific challenge of 
climate change and how endogenous institutional change might affect it. 
The framework proposed by Meuwissen et al. (2019) to assess specified and 
general resilience at the farming system scale is strictly applicable to viticulture. As 
primary functions, GI wine systems provide private (e.g., wine, income) and public 
goods (e.g., environmental and landscape quality and the GI brand as a regional 
development resource). Hence, we will try to explore climate resilience through the 
provision of these functions. 
Finally, in the attempt to apply resilience thinking to this study, we bring in 
evidence from several disciplines (i.e., economics, sociology, agricultural sciences, 
law and climatology) both in model development as well as in the results and 
discussion phases which are at the core of the following chapters.  
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In the previous sections, we highlighted how climate change might challenge the 
definitions of collective regional brands such as GIs. At the micro-level, climate 
change is likely to affect farmers’ ability to respect the quality standards by altering 
traditional wine features. Parallel to quality targets, producers must also employ 
traditional production methods, limiting “technological adaptation”. In this setting, 
we discussed how institutional change, through the collective action of local 
producers in the amendment of production standards, might be a secondary 
adaptation branch worth investigating. However, it is unclear how local 
institutional, socio-economic, and environmental factors influence this 
“institutional adaptation” process. 
European viticulture is particularly vulnerable to potential climate effects on GI. 
Small farms have little capacity to predict climatic impacts and select effective 
adaptation practices. Furthermore, several wine-making territories in Europe are 
controlled by cooperatives that rely on GI collective brands due to low investing 
capacity in intangibles and private brands. Above cooperatives, consortia of 
producers are another important collective agent in the sector that manage the GI 
and can include cooperatives and corporate firms in a GI area. The predominance 
of these collective agents implies a complex collective decision-making framework, 
where ill-defined property rights and members’ heterogeneity might lead to the 
emergence of social dilemmas and slow down the institutional change process. 
We represent this framework in an ABM with endogenous institutional change, 
allowing us to study how environmental and institutional settings might influence 
the system’s adaptive capacity and climate resilience. In the model, we assume that 
a single cooperative coordinates a group of small farms in a recognised GI region. 
In this way, the cooperative is also the only agent managing the GI and responsible 
for any change in the production standards. Therefore, we merged the two stages of 
collective decision making: first between the cooperative’s members and second 
between GI producers in the region. The new collective agents, representing both 
cooperative’s and GI consortium’s management board, will be called “GI board”. 
Furthermore, modelling a single cooperative, we can ignore farms’ ability to invest 
in their own brands and the trade-off between collective and private brands. Second, 




the endogenous rule changing process to a one-member-one-vote collective 
decision. In the next sections, we present the model’s essential components. Then, 
we go through the experimental design driving the model’s simulations. 
4.1. The model 
We used the “Overview, Design concept, Details + Decision-making” (ODD+D) 
protocol (Müller et al. 2013) first as a model development guide and later to provide 
comprehensive and standardised model documentation. A full version of the 
protocol is provided in appendix 1.A of the thesis. 
4.1.1.             Overview 
The model aims to test how different collective-choice rules (i.e., voting 
mechanisms) and spatial heterogeneity affect the interaction among wine GI 
stakeholders through an endogenous institutional change process. The outcome of 
this process could affect the system’s climate resilience. In the model, farm agents 
can endogenously change one common operational rule through voting, precisely, 
a quality standard. The model allows testing different impact scenarios driven by 
two exogenous climate change processes and different institutional and 
environmental settings. As a theoretical model, it can be used to explore general 
system dynamics employing illustrative data representative of an average GI wine 
production system in the EU. Therefore, the aim is not to describe or predict any 
real-life setting. However, it might provide interesting theoretical insights on the 
role of institutional change in climate adaptation and resilience of agricultural 
production systems, particularly as a starting point for future research and model 
development. The model was programmed in NetLogo® (Wilensky & Evanston 
1999) v 6.2. The R (Thiele & Grimm 2010) and GIS extensions were used in the 
initialisation. The code and all model materials are available on the author’s GitHub 
page2. 
4.1.2.             Entities and agents 
The model explicitly considers the spatial dimension in a 100x100 regular square 
lattice. Each cell corresponds to one hectare defining a total region of 10 km2. 
Patches have different state variables, including soil quality, altitude, and 
microclimate. The model is dynamic, running through 55-year simulations in one-
year timesteps. Two agent types are involved: farms, embodying individual human 




agents, and the GI board representing an institutional/collective agent. The farms' 
main state variables are their location and land endowment, a capital stock variable, 
a list of past vintage quality and profits that function as a memory base in decision-
making. Moreover, farms also have a “ballot” variable which they use in the 
institutional change process. On the other hand, the GI board has only one variable 
(revenue) to collect fees from farms each year. 
4.1.3.             Model dynamics 
Figure 1 summarises the main model components and overviews the scheduling 
from point 1 (environmental change) to point 10 (institutional change 
process).  Every simulation starts with an exogenous regional warming trend 
updating each cell’s microclimate and potential wine quality. Farms and the GI 
board can sense environmental variables such as slope and wine quality and use 
them to make decisions. Farms have partial sensing capacity (i.e., limited to their 
neighbourhood), while the GI board has global sensing capacity, and information 
is free to retrieve. 
Then, the model’s schedule is conceptually divided into two action situations. 
Every year, in the operational situation, farms follow simple heuristics to maximise 
profit and maintain high average quality levels by adapting to climate change. 
Farms can act on land use decisions only. They face two different prices depending 
on whether their average quality is higher or lower than the quality standard. First, 
farms can set unprofitable plots fallow. Second, after selling the wine, based on the 
memory of past quality, they try to substitute low-quality plots with high-quality 
ones in their neighbouring patches. Finally, they can also abandon plots if they are 
no longer profitable. Importantly, no land market is implemented (see sub-model 
“farm heuristic”). Moreover, it is assumed that farms always respect the quality 
standard, for example, implying that the GI Board acts effectively in creating 
incentives to follow the rules (i.e., no moral hazard considered).  
 
Figure 1. Model overview and schedule. 
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The GI board acts after farms in the operational situation. First, it updates the GI 
area attributing the label only to patches with wine quality higher than the quality 
standard. Second, it collects a fixed percentage of the total revenue and spends it 
on marketing to increase the collective brand’s value. The rest of the budget is 
assumed to be allocated in quality control, ensuring farms respect the standards and 
for other administrative expenses. The brand value increases the prestige of the GI 
and partially substitutes for quality, which ultimately affects GI wine price. So, the 
last action of the GI board is to update the GI prestige and GI wine price. Thus, this 
agent does not make decisions but applies a fixed rule and updates global variables 
such as collective brand value, GI wine price, and GI area. (More on the mechanism 
driving GI prestige and wine prices in section 4.1.5). 
In the end, the collective-choice situation arises when the GI board has concluded 
its actions and involves only farm agents. A democratic process is initiated every 
five years in which each farm can cast one vote to change one GI operational rule 
(i.e., the quality standard). They vote based on the memory of past vintage quality. 
Ballots are collected, and the quality standard is changed depending on the voting 
mechanism in place (See Appendix 1.D for a general flowchart of the model).  
4.1.4. Initialisation 
First, elevation is defined randomly from a uniform distribution (ranging from 0 to 
800 m).  A random raster is generated and then smoothed with a gaussian kernel 
using an R program. The same technique is applied to generate a raster for soil 
quality. These rasters are used in the NetLogo programme to define the spatial 
environment. Slope data is calculated by performing a convolution of the elevation 
data frame with the GIS extensions. 
The elevation is used to downscale an arbitrary given regional average growing 
season (GS) temperature (17°C). We want to model the case in which the region 
has already reached its climatic optimality for the vine variety in use. Therefore, we 
set an optimal GS temperature matching the average GS temperature of 17°C (more 
information in appendix 1.B). Average GS temperature and soil quality are then 
used to define the potential wine quality for each plot “i” using equation 1 (soil and 
wine quality range from 0 to 1) 
WineQi  =  0.4  × SoilQi  +  0.6 ×  (1 −




We combined Eurostat3 country-specific data on total farms and cultivated hectares 
for PDOs (the most restrictive GI label) with data on the total number of PDOs 
                                                 
3 Eurostat wine statistics 
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found in the GI database of the European Commission “eAmbrosia”4. Only the top 
five wine producers (France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, and Germany) were considered. 
With this data, we calibrated a representative GI region consisting of 680 farms 
over a total cultivated area of 1850 ha, with an average farm size of 2.72 ha. Then, 
the quality standard is set as the minimum average wine quality of farms (i.e., they 
can all respect the standard in time zero).  The total cost per hectare is given by 
equation 2, where FC = 2500€ is the fixed costs for keeping any plot productive 
(including fallow plots or with juvenile vines). Variable costs apply to productive 
plots only and are related to labour costs and slope as in Delay et al. (2015). Given 
the yearly salary of 20000€, a worker can harvest 10 ha with an average slope ≤ 
10% (slope = [0, 1]). Thereafter harvesting becomes increasingly difficult with 
slope. In this way, we skip modelling hiring labour and use a continuous labour cost 
variable per hectare (e.g., a plot with a slope of 25% requires 0.25 farmers, thus 
5000 €/ha*yr). 
TCi  =  𝐹𝐶 +   slopei ×  20000 (2) 
profi  = 5000 × pw − 𝑇𝐶𝑖 (3) 
Wine yield is fixed at 5000 l/ha, and two prices are given at the start: standard wine 
is sold at 1€/l and GI wine at 1.5€/l. Equation 3 is a patch-specific profitability 
variable considering total costs and total revenues. Finally, the land price is 
proportional to quality and is calculated following equation 4, with “giLabel” being 
a dummy variable. Official data on viticultural land prices is hard to find. In France, 
average prices, excluding the Champagne GI, were estimated at around 69000 €/ha 
in 20175. Here we ponder a maximum price of 70000 €/ha. 
𝑃𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑  =  wineQi × 50000 + giLabeli × 20000 (4) 
4.1.5. Sub-models 
Environmental change 
A linear and deterministic climate change process raises the average GS 
temperature of each plot every year. Assuming to start around 2020, two climate 
change scenarios are considered, corresponding to a +2°C and +3°C temperature 
increase from pre-industrial age to 2100, with a yearly increase of 0.0125 and 0.025 
°C, respectively (see appendix 1.B). 
                                                 
4 eAmbrosia data base 





Farm heuristic  
 Leave plot fallow (“profit maximising” heuristic) 
First, farms calculate the average wine quality of their productive plots. They adopt 
two different “strategies”. If the average quality is greater than or equal to the 
quality standard, they can pool and sell all wine at the higher GI premium. 
Otherwise, they can split production and sell both GI and standard wine separately. 
Leaving a plot fallow is the only way farms can avoid paying its variable production 
costs, and they do so if a plot’s expected profit is less than - 2500€ (i.e., fixed costs 
of keeping plot fallow). 
 Sell wine and update capital 
Farms collect their harvest, sell the wine to the respective prices, and update their 
capital. They have no access to credit and exit the business if production costs 
cannot be covered. In a cooperative, revenues would be redistributed based on 
patronage; thus, we simplify further and assume that each farm directly sells wine, 
omitting the delivery to the GI board. There is no real market for wine, and 
production disappears at given prices. 
 Sell plot lowest quality plot 
As a long-term adaptation measure, farms can buy a new high-quality plot each 
year. This strategy is applied when farms perceive their average quality has 
decreased over the previous five years (farm’s memory). New vineyards’ 
installations are strongly regulated in the EU and can reach a maximum of 1% of 
the total planted area each year (Pomarici & Sardone 2020). To avoid dealing with 
a planting rights market, we assume that a new plot can only be cultivated if a 
farmer renounces another plot. They select the lowest quality plot, sell it, and 
eradicate the vines. No land market is modelled here; each plot is simply free when 
no farm owns it, while prices are defined by equation 4. Likewise, plots that are no 
longer suitable or profitable can be sold and become available for other purposes. 
 Buy high-quality plot 
When farms have a planting right (e.g., acquired by selling a plot), they can buy a 
new plot and plant vines on it. They search for the most profitable available field 
nearby with quality higher than the quality standard. The vines’ age is set to zero 
and age each year after the farm sells wine. A plot stays unproductive for three 
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years. The average vines’ age in each plot does not get above 20 years, assuming 
that the vineyard is maintained at an optimal age, ignoring old vines’ substitution.  
 Abandon farming 
Finally, if farms have registered negative profits in the previous five years, they 
will sell the least profitable. When only the farmstead plot is left, the farm agent 
exits.  
GI Board action 
 Fees’ collection and Marketing investment 
First, the GI Board reshapes the GI area, defining which patch gets the GI label 
(important information for farms since it defines plots profitability and land prices). 
Then, it collects a fixed share (10%) of farms’ revenues. The GI board makes no 
profits; half of its revenue is assumed to disappear in quality control and ensure 
standard compliance. The other half is spent in an endogenous brand value creation 
process. The Board invests in marketing to increase the collective brand value 
(CBV in equation 5), a form of intangible capital which behaves following a 
standard capital accumulation function. The value of the collective brand 
depreciates fast, by 40% each year (rho = 0.4), following literature on intangible 
capital (Corrado et al. 2020). 
 Update GI prestige and wine price 
Finally, the Board updates the GI prestige level. The GI prestige can take five levels 
which depend on three variables: the collective brand value (the intangible capital 
stock described above), average wine quality from productive GI plots, and the 
percentage of farms producing GI wine. These three variables are divided into five 
levels/intervals, as Table 1 shows. Importantly, we set an arbitrary minimum value 
of collective brand value (named “basBrandValue” or “bbv”) of 1000000 € to 
define the levels. 
Table 1. Categorisation of main GI prestige variables into five levels.  
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
GI quality < 0.5 [0.5,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) > 0.9 
Collective brand 
value 








% of GI farms < 0.5 [0.5,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) > 0.9 
The average level of the three variables is rounded to the closest integer value and 
used as the GI prestige level. Increasing prestige level ensures a higher GI wine 
price, as in Table 2. Level 0 corresponds to the standard wine price. 
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Table 2. Prestige levels and respective GI wine price. 
GI prestige Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
GI wine price 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
It is essential to underline that the following framework is the result of arbitrary 
modeller choices. Both variables and the intervals set here have an important impact 
on the outcome. The three variables affecting GI prestige (i.e., a form of collective 
reputation) are inspired by theoretical literature on collective brand reputation 
(Fishman et al. 2018) and empirical studies on consumers’ WTP for wine (Schamel 
2009; Beckert et al. 2017), discussed in the previous chapters. The underlying idea 
is that a region can partially substitute average quality by consistently investing in 
other forms of intangible/symbolic capital embodied in the collective GI brand 
through marketing. Other than increasing total returns, the number of GI farms can 
also increase the signal provided to consumers. 
Endogenous institutional change (collective-choice situation) 
Farms can vote to change the quality standard: keep it constant, increase it, or 
decrease it. The delta variation achievable in each institutional change process is 
exogenously set to 1%. Institutional change is initiated every five years, a 
reasonable estimate for a long and centralised bureaucratic process. First, farms will 
vote to decrease the standard when they can no longer fulfil it in the current period. 
Then, they also retrieve the average wine quality achieved in the previous five 
years. If decreasing, they vote to lower the standard; otherwise, they vote to increase 
it only if a higher standard can be fulfilled. When no trend is shown in the previous 
years, farms will vote to keep the standard constant. Farms check trends by simply 
comparing the 5-year average quality with the present one and can sense quality 
variations in the order of 1%. 
With the process described above, a farm-specific state variable called "ballot" is 
updated with value 1 (increase) -1 (decrease) or 0 (keep constant). Then ballots are 
collected in a list called “ballot-box”. Votes are counted, and the final decision is 
taken depending on the exogenously defined voting mechanism. The ballot box is 
emptied at the end of the process. 
4.2.  Experimental design and model simulations 
By using the BehaviorSpace tool in NetLogo, we run several simulations in which 
we systematically change levels of one exogenous variable (or factor) at a time. 
Three exogenous variables are considered: climate scenario, landscape 
heterogeneity, and voting mechanism (Table 3). The first two factors have two 
levels each: for climate scenarios, it is “Moderate” and “Strong” (i.e., +2°C, +3°C); 
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for landscape heterogeneity, it is relatively “heterogeneous” and “homogeneous” 
(i.e., with sigma (variance) of the Gaussian smoothing kernel of 1.5 and 3 
respectively). Finally, we consider three different voting mechanisms on the 
institutional side: a no-vote baseline, a relative, and an absolute majority system. 
Therefore, we have an experimental design with a total of 2x2x3 = 12 combinations, 
each run 100 times, for a total of 1200 simulations. Each simulation runs for 55 
years, and data is collected at each timestep. The first five years were removed from 
the data frame due to several variables’ “spin-up” effect starting from zero.  
In the next section, we introduce the four output variables taken as proxies of the 
system’s climate resilience for our analysis, present and discuss the results attained. 
 
Table 3. Three exogenous factors and corresponding levels driving the model’s simulations. 
FACTORS LEVELS 
Climate Scenario  + 2°C  + 3°C  
Landscape  sigma = 1.5 
(heterogeneous) 
sigma = 3.0 
(homogeneous) 
 






5.1.  Results 
This section presents and discusses the model’s output relevant to our analysis. We 
analyse four variables to proxy the system’s ability to preserve its main functions 
when facing climatic challenges (i.e., climate resilience). First, a cooperative 
viticultural system provides income to wine growers (i.e., private goods). Then, 
especially in the GI context, the combination of social and ecological factors 
(terroir) contributes to forming a collective reputation or value of the regional brand 
(i.e., common good). Third, viticultural activities help maintain the landscape and 
the local environment in good condition (i.e., public good). Such functional macro-
categories are represented here by total farm exits and average profits, collective 
brand value, and a land-use index ratio based on total abandoned and acquired plots. 
 
Table 4. Full factorial design matrix reporting all twelve factors’ combinations (i.e., scenarios). 
n. Climate 
Change 
Landscape Voting Mechanism Name Colour 




2HetAM light blue 
2 + 3°C Sigma = 1.5 AM 3HetAM dark blue 
3 + 2°C Sigma = 3.0 
(homogenous) 
AM 2HomAM light green 
4 + 3°C Sigma = 3.0 AM 3HomAM dark green 
5 + 2°C Sigma = 1.5 NV (No Vote) 2HetNV pink 
6 + 3°C Sigma = 1.5 NV 3HetNV red 
7 + 2°C Sigma = 3.0 NV 2HomNV yellow  
8 + 3°C Sigma = 3.0 NV 3HomNV orange 
9 + 2°C Sigma = 1.5 RM (Relative 
Majority) 
2HetRM lilac 
10 + 3°C Sigma = 1.5 RM 3HetRM purple 
11 + 2°C Sigma = 3.0 RM 2HomRM light brown 
12 + 3°C Sigma = 3.0 RM 3HomRM dark brown 
  
5. Results and Discussion  
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In Table 4, the full factorial design matrix of our experiment is presented. We 
abbreviate the names of each scenario to facilitate the analysis. For example, the 
scenario “2HetAM” stands for one with a milder temperature increase (+ 2°C), a 
relatively heterogeneous landscape and the possibility of changing the rule by 
absolute majority.  Moreover, each scenario is assigned to a colour, with darker 
shades indicating “+3°C” climate change scenarios.  
Figure 2 provides an overview of the main variables under scrutiny. Each line 
represents the within-scenario average, i.e., across 100 scenario-specific 
simulations. We plot data from period (year) five to limit confusion due to the spin-
up of several variables (e.g., both total profits and collective brand value are set to 
zero at initialisation and jump to their maximum level around period 5). 
Let us start from the first graph on the top left corner (Figure 2.a). “Farm exits” is 
a cumulative value expressed in percentage of the initial condition (N = 680 farms). 
We can distinguish a first outcome branch exhibiting high percentages of farm 
exits. These three scenarios (red, blue, and purple lines) are characterised by 
heterogeneity of landscape and strong climate change. As the climate is directly 
connected to wine quality in the model, this comes with no surprise: the higher the 
temperature increase, the lower farms’ wine quality, increasing the risk of 
breaching the standard and losing the GI label that makes the business viable. 
Moreover, the standard is particularly limiting in cases of high spatial 
heterogeneity. Heterogeneity increases the average slope value and production 
costs per hectare, thus the importance of accessing higher premia to stay in business 
(i.e., using the GI label). For this branch, the endogenous rule change process starts 
producing effects around period 33, when farms collectively decide to decrease the 
GI quality standard. The result is a substantial difference within the “3Het” branch 
in average farm exit values at period 55, with the no-vote (NV, in red) still 
increasing over 50%, and the two absolute (AM, in blue) and relative majority (RM, 
in violet) scenarios levelling at around 30% of the original population. 
The “3Hom” combinations follow a pattern similar to the “3Het” case. We see a 
large spread between the NV (orange) and the AM/RM subcases (green and brown), 
initially steeper concave curves, with farm exits gradually slowing down. On the 
other hand, all moderate climate change scenarios exhibit convex curves with the 
lowest exit rates for most of the period considered. Endogenous rule changing does 
not produce any noticeable effect in both “2Het” and “2Hom” branches. As earlier, 





Figure 3. Resilience indicators, average across 100 simulations for each one of the twelve scenarios.  
Figure 2. GI wine price and its driving factors, average across 100 simulations for each one of the twelve scenarios. 
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Can we say anything about the effect of different voting mechanisms (i.e., AM and 
RM scenarios)? No. Even though AM sub-cases are slightly above the RM ones, 
but only in the harshest climate scenario. We expected rule amendment to be more 
successful in the RM scenario, especially with high spatial heterogeneity, but this 
is not shown in the results. On the other hand, we observe that institutional change 
(i.e., the decrease of the production standard) happens only with homogeneous 
landscapes in the moderate climate scenario. In fact, we can see a narrow spread in 
between NV (yellow) and AM/RM (light green and light brown) sub-cases in the 
“2Hom” branch.  
Average profits and collective brand value are expressed in thousands of euros.  
Here, we can better appreciate some emerging patterns driven by endogenous 
institutional change. In the first 25 years of the simulation, Figure 2.b, shows four 
main branches marked by different climate and landscape factor combinations. In 
all homogenous landscape scenarios, profits reach the maximum due to low average 
slope and production costs per hectare. On the other hand, although landscape 
heterogeneity leads to lower profits in the short-run (keeping the climate constant), 
it maintains higher profits for a longer time (see branch yellow vs lilac and orange 
vs red). As expected, landscape heterogeneity improves individual farms’ 
adaptability by increasing the portion of new suitable land around them. 
Not surprisingly, the stronger the climate change, the faster profits drop in both 
landscape configurations (see branch yellow vs orange and lilac vs red). Things get 
complex after year 25 when institutional change starts to be effective. Stronger 
climate scenarios are primarily affected, starting from the “3Hom” branch at tick 
25. In this case, institutional change causes profits to fluctuate widely. The 
underlying intuition is that, by decreasing the quality standard, more farms can keep 
the GI label, access the higher price and increase average profitability. On the other 
hand, climate change is fast in these setups, and it immediately puts pressure back 
onto farms that rapidly lose the GI and experience a drop in profitability until a new 
agreement on decreasing the standard is found.   
In the “3Het” branch, a collective decision on decreasing the standard is only found 
from tick 30 onwards. This can be for two main reasons: the first, heterogeneity of 
landscape, implies heterogeneity of impacts, making it arduous to find an 
agreement; the second, spatial heterogeneity increases individual adaptive capacity, 
reducing or delaying the need for collective action. This should be further tested by 
limiting individual adaptive capacity in the model. Finally, institutional change 




Production is fixed at 5000 litres/ha, and demand is assumed to cover supply (see 
section 4.1.5). Thus, the main driver for average profit is the GI wine price. The 
relevance of price comes clear in figure 3.a. First, prices drop around tick 12 and 
22 causing falling total profits in the “3Hom” and “3Het” branches. The same 
occurs again after tick 20 and 37 (see orange and red lines), dragging down profits 
further. The price fluctuation also causes the emergence of the oscillatory patterns 
for scenarios “3HomAM” (green), “3HomRM” (brown), “3HetAM”, and 
“3HetRM”, and we also understand why the former two appear wavier than the 
latter. In fact, prices are on average stable in the “3Het” branch between tick 25 and 
50, while the opposite emerges in the “3Hom” branch. Decomposing price into its 
three steering factors helps understanding how these oscillations emerge. First, 
quality plays a role in the definition of price only in the strong climate scenario. 
Interestingly, the quality level is constant in the “3HetNV” scenario, meaning that 
the few remaining farms managed to use the microclimatic landscape diversity to 
maintain high quality (Figure 3.b). The level of collective brand value stays 
constant from period 20 to 55 for all scenarios except “3HomNV” and “3HetNv”. 
On the other hand, the level of percentage share of GI farms (i.e., given by the % 
of GI farms over the total number of farms) appears to be causing the oscillating 
profit patterns.  
The reader should be reminded that these level variables are integers ranging from 
0 to 4 (see section 4.1.5). The oscillation between levels 0 and 1 of % share of GI 
farms causes major disbalances in the price, affecting profitability in the green and 
brown scenarios. On the other hand, in the blue and purple cases, the oscillation 
between level 1 and 2 does not affect the price. However, it implies a variable 
portion of farms allowed to use the GI label, thus causing those “smoother waves” 
seen in Figure 2.b. 
Moving to Figure 2.c, we can say that collective brand value closely follows the 
previous profits dynamics, mainly price-driven. The “2Het” branch achieves the 
best results consistently through time. Consequently, endogenous rule change 
prevents profits falling under 1M €, unlike when fast climatic change and no voting 
opportunity are considered.  
Finally, in Figure 2.d, the ratio of total cumulative abandoned to acquired land is 
shown. The index indicates whether the original viticultural landscape is 
endangered. Three out of four “NV” scenarios led to the three highest index levels, 
where abandoned land at year 55 is around 3.7, 3, and 2.5 times greater than the 
newly acquired portion (see orange, yellow, and red lines). The ample spread within 
the “3Hom” branch caused by endogenous institutional change is the first to capture 
the attention. Plots are abandoned for three reasons in the model: substitution with 
higher quality land, unprofitability, and farm exit. Land can be easily substituted 
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when the landscape is heterogenous, the reason why most “Het” scenarios occupy 
the lower region of the graph. In the “3HomNV” scenario, we see that the index 
tracks farm exits, at least in the second half of the simulation, indicating that farm 
exits is the driving factor for land abandonment from around period 20 onwards. 
This intuition is confirmed when looking at the “3Het” and the “2Het” branches. In 
year 25, the quality standard starts being amended in the “3Hom” branch. We see 
how the two scenarios with institutional change (green and brown lines) take a 
diverging path leading the index to its local minimum at tick 55. The “3Hom” 
branch is the most successful in terms of the number of rule amendments. 
Decreasing the standard broadens the availability of newly suitable plots, farms re-
start cultivating land, plummeting the index (see dark green and dark brown lines 
in figure 2.d).  
Unexpectedly, in the first half of the simulation, the land index for the “2Hom” 
branch rises the fastest (yellow, light brown and light green lines). We expected the 
“3Hom” branch to be the highest in these cases given the reasons already discussed. 
Figure 4 shows the complete data for the land use index with punctual observation 
for each simulation at each period (see appendix 2 for similar graphs of the other 
variables). Colours and line/dot types represent climate and landscape factors, while 
facets are used for different voting mechanisms sub-samples. See the presence of 
several outliers in the “2Hom” scenarios (green crosses) in both institutional change 
setting. Decomposing the number of abandoned hectares by cause (i.e., farm exit, 
unprofitability, and substitution) clarified that these outliers are characterised by 
low substitution and high abandonment for unprofitability and farm exit. The reason 
why mainly “2Hom” scenarios are affected is most likely that in this scenario, 
climate change is too slow to urge farms to adapt by substituting land, which would 
shrink the index’s denominator (i.e., newly acquired plots). Eventually, when farms 
start noticing a decrease in quality and substituting land (year 20), the index levels 
out at around 2.5.  
 
  
Figure 4. Land Use Index, full data for different voting mechanisms. 
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For completeness and to give an idea of within-scenario variability, figure 5 offers 
a boxplot representation of the four main output variables for years 5, 15, 25, 35, 
45, and 55. The asterisk sign represents the mean within 100 simulations for each 
one of the twelve scenarios at each point in time. On the other hand, the coloured 
lines connect the median of each scenario at each point in time (i.e., the central line 
of each boxplot). Finally, Table 5 reports the mean and standard deviation for each 
scenario at period 55. Appendix 3 offers a more detailed representation of the 
distribution of these variables at the end of the simulation. 
  




Table 5. Mean and Standard Deviation of main outcome variables for each scenario at period 55. 








NAME COLOUR MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD MEAN SD 
2HetAM light blue 19.072 2.110 6.250 2.263 1812.954 186.591 2.100 0.201 1.517 0.085 








11.629 2.467 2.298 0.463 1316.814 70.870 1.500 0.000 1.282 0.080 
2HetNV pink 19.259 2.072 6.042 2.139 1790.261 176.444 2.075 0.179 1.516 0.080 
3HetNV red 51.815 2.300 -0.462 0.128 534.655 34.437 1.500 0.000 2.488 0.137 
2HomNV yellow  12.994 2.417 1.241 0.232 1196.196 52.684 1.500 0.000 2.920 0.442 
3HomNV orange 21.381 3.137 -0.302 0.039 910.585 34.922 1.350 0.230 3.782 0.676 
2HetRM lilac 19.156 2.118 6.098 2.219 1787.310 185.587 2.090 0.193 1.524 0.092 








11.578 2.191 2.273 0.251 1321.344 74.744 1.500 0.000 1.280 0.078 
5.2. Discussion 
The model’s results highlight a possible twofold role of landscape heterogeneity on 
the climate resilience of the system. First, landscape heterogeneity improves 
individual farms’ adaptive capacity. In other words, it allows relocating vineyards 
to high elevation plots where a cooler microclimate guarantees a better wine 
quality. Several viticultural regions in Europe have already climbed the mountains 
around them to adapt to higher temperatures, and this is a typical adaptation process 
that will continue in the future (Moriondo et al. 2013; Gutiérrez‐Gamboa et al. 
2021). Second, although a heterogeneous landscape accelerates farm exits due to 
higher production costs, we have shown how it also helps the system to achieve 
higher and more stable profits throughout the simulation.  
On the other hand, heterogeneity might also slow down collective decision making. 
This is because, within scenarios allowing for endogenous institutional change, 
heterogeneous landscape settings were less likely to result in decreasing the quality 
standard, exhibiting a delayed onset of the rule amendment process. In milder 
climate change scenarios, institutional change was generally not adopted by farms, 
except for the homogenous settings around the end of the simulation, confirming 
our point. 
Cooperative systems already suffer from different forms of member heterogeneity, 
leading to diversity of member’s interests and objectives (Höhler & Kühl 2017). 
Heterogeneity can lead to low willingness to cooperate among members, 
incentivise free-riding, and the emergence of social dilemmas. The model ignores 
moral hazard and opportunistic behaviours in the operational arena (e.g., to declare 
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untruthful information on wine quality at delivery).  Nonetheless, our results 
underline that social dilemmas do not affect the operational area only and might 
also emerge in the collective-choice arena where farms decide how to shape their 
institutional environment and constraints. Lowering standards helps many remain 
in business but might also damage those who can individually cope with climate 
change. To some extent, the model hints at the existence of incentives to leave the 
cooperative for the best performing and most adaptive farms, possibly another 
example of self-selection of cooperative members leading to poor collective 
performances (Castriota 2020 p. 176). However, we did not model the possibility 
of single farms delivering grapes to other companies, expanding, investing in 
private brands, and creating individual standards. Therefore, we leave exploring 
these mechanisms to future research, in which cooperatives and corporations could 
be confronted, and cooperatives’ and GI consortium’s boards separated 
accordingly.  
When farms were enabled to engage in endogenous institutional change, 
considerable variations in our target variables were recorded, including the 
emergence of complex/chaotic behaviours. This only applies to the “+ 3°C” climate 
change scenario, which is arguably the most relevant if climate action continues to 
fail. Different voting mechanisms did not show significant differences in the 
outcome. The two one-farm-one-vote systems are probably too similar. New voting 
mechanisms and governance structures could be tested in future model 
development by looking at literature on cooperatives (Chaddad & Cook 2004; 
Bijman et al. 2014).  
The quality standard was never increased in the 1200 simulations performed. 
However, a few parameters (e.g., memory, farms’ precision, and quality delta) play 
an essential role in this process and should be tested with a systematic sensitivity 
analysis. In fact, during model debugging, we could observe that increasing 
memory and precision can enhance amendment effectiveness and cause the 
standard to fluctuate (i.e., increase and decrease). This also has interesting policy 
implications, for example, concerning investments in information sharing and 
quality monitoring which could have significant repercussions on the institutional 
change process. 
Lowering, or changing, quality standards as a possible adaptation measure might 
be a slippery slope. In fact, changing quality might betray consumers expectations, 
reduce reputation and willingness to pay. In our model, we introduced investments 
in intangibles as a compensating measure for quality reduction/change. These two 
actions complement each other and should be planned carefully, improving 
synergies between them. 
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More specifically, we explored the possibility for the GI system to substitute quality 
with intangible capital to maintain a high collective reputation/prestige and high 
premia. We exemplify this by modelling the role of marketing investments and 
collective brand value in a price formation module. However, this could also be 
regarded as a general expenditure in intangibles, including research and 
development, climate-smart technologies. This option was available and employed 
by the GI board in the model. However, as discussed in the previous chapters, in 
reality, cooperatives suffer from low investment capability, especially in intangible 
assets. This might significantly limit their ability to use this adaptation option which 
is a vital complement to the institutional adaptation of production/quality standards.  
Total profits and collective brand value were the highest in the “2Het” branch, and 
those scenarios allowing for endogenous institutional change. Due to the specific 
model assumptions (i.e., GI board simply investing a fixed share of total revenues), 
profits and brand value are closely related. In the future, the GI board agent should 
be given a more sophisticated decision-making heuristic (e.g., maximising brand 
value while keeping high compliance incentives for farms) which could 
substantially change our results. 
Introducing the effect of the percentage share of GI farms in the area on prestige 
and GI price led to the emergence of oscillating prices. These results raise a few 
concerns about the arbitrariness of this price formation mechanism. Although the 
idea is to represent the importance of intangibles (brand value) (Beckert et al. 2017), 
the level (GI farms’ quality) (Schamel 2009) and the strength (GI farms quota) 
(Fishman et al. 2018) of reputational quality signals on wine price, the choice of 
this particular level setup are perhaps the most critical limitations of this study. 
However, it was not easy to find parameters in the literature to calibrate such a 
mechanism. For example, what is the basic level of cumulative intangible 
expenditure (collective brand value) that guarantees higher GI wine premia? Using 
our model for future empirical studies, presume the careful calibration of a better 
prestige/reputation and price formation module, including the exploration of new 
driving factors. Moreover, if farms’ opportunistic behaviour and costly rule control 
and punishment were modelled, the effect of the total share of GI farms would have 
to be reconsidered. In that case, the more farms, the higher the chance of 
opportunistic behaviours to emerge and the cost of controlling for the GI board 
(Fishman et al. 2018).  
Finally, we used a simple land use index to evaluate the role of spatial heterogeneity 
and endogenous institutional change on land abandonment. We can conclude that 
heterogeneous landscapes might help maintain the original size of the viticultural 
area, backing the concept that diversity, in all its forms, is a supporting condition 
for resilience (Folke et al. 2010; Folke 2016). On the other hand, allowing 
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institutional change effectively reduced the ratio between abandoned and newly 
acquired plots. However, the index is too general to say anything about the 
preservation of the original viticultural landscape. More sophisticated landscape 
heterogeneity indices, e.g., looking at the aggregation of contiguous vineyards, 
should be analysed in the future. Moreover, this result is also highly influenced by 
our choice of allowing new land acquisition only through substitution of no longer 
suitable plots. An improved land and planting rights market should be introduced 
in the future, also allowing best performing farms to expand. 
Nevertheless, our simple observation calls for further research into the effect of 
contrasting agricultural interests/purposes in a region. Even if landscape 
heterogeneity and institutional change increase the possibility of converting new 
plots to viticulture, the model completely ignores the previous use of those plots, 
whether they were protected ecological areas or necessary for another agricultural 
purpose.  
The absence of a systematic sensitivity analysis on the main parameters should 
warn the reader to interpret our results critically. This also limits the use of inference 
and statistical hypothesis testing on this data which, in our case, would only be 
misleading.   
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European viticulture is particularly vulnerable to potential climate effects on GI. 
Small farms have little capacities to predict climatic impacts and select effective 
adaptation practices. Furthermore, several wine-making territories in Europe are 
controlled by cooperatives that rely on GI collective brands due to low investing 
capacity in intangibles and private brands. 
Drawing from institutional economics theory and literature on cooperatives and 
collective brand, we created a novel theoretical model with endogenous 
institutional change to explore the climate resilience of cooperative GI viticultural 
systems in the EU. 
As the main objective of the thesis, we explored the effect of different institutional 
(i.e., voting mechanisms) and environmental (i.e., landscape heterogeneity) settings 
on climate resilience in terms of the system’s ability to maintain its main functions 
(i.e., providing private, collective, and public goods). Farm exits, average profit, 
collective brand value, and a land abandonment index were used as proxies for 
those functions.  
We compared the average output of 100 simulations for each of the 12 factors’ 
combinations. The inclusion of endogenous institutional change led to considerable 
variations in all target variables, including the emergence of complex/chaotic 
behaviours. It enabled the system to reduce farm exits, increase profitability and 
collective brand value. We showed how landscape heterogeneity has a twofold role 
in the climate resilience of the system. It increases individual adaptability but 
obstructs collective adaptive capacity through institutional change. The two 
different voting mechanisms considered (i.e., relative and absolute majority) did 
not produce any discernible result. 
The model has several limitations, especially regarding few arbitrary choices made 
in the context of the price formation mechanism. The representation of GI board 
behaviour, which applies a standard rule without making any actual decision, is also 
highly simplistic. Moreover, the lack of a systematic sensitivity analysis warns the 
reader to interpret these results critically. Several parameters have a significant 




Future model development is necessary to implement better price formation 
mechanisms and introduce a slightly more sophisticated land and land-use module. 
Second, different voting mechanisms could be tested, comprising the possibility for 
farms to cooperate/communicate, form networks and alliances. Further, new 
resilience indicators could be developed, exploring dimensions of diversity, 
redundancy, and interconnectedness. Finally, it would be interesting to include both 
cooperative farms and private companies and explore more complex interactions 
between different agent types in the GI production system. 
The model is comprehensively documented and freely available online. We used a 
multidisciplinary approach to build a flexible theoretical model adaptable to 
different study sites with the necessary modifications. This research also 
contributes to developing literature on considering endogenous institutional change 
as a climate change adaptation option in agricultural systems, connecting climate 
impact, institutional, and agricultural economics studies through agent-based 
modelling.  
Our results cannot be used to predict any real case scenario or inform specific 
policies. They are proofs of concept that stimulate further empirical research, 
especially in the role of environmental heterogeneity and institutional setting on 
climate resilience when allowing for endogenous institutional change. This work 
can interest wine GI production regions and other agricultural systems based on 
collective reputations and quality standards impacted by climate change. Even 
though we cannot make any case-specific policy recommendation, in general, we 
highlighted the importance of policies oriented to strengthening investments in 
intangibles and facilitating GI rule amendments, especially in sectors where 
cooperatives predominate due to poor intangible investments capability and other 
issues connected to member heterogeneity. 
Using data to calibrate the model and relax theoretical assumption could generate 
important empirical findings on the impact of different social, institutional and 
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I. Overview I.i Purpose 
I.i.a What is the 
purpose of the 
study? 
We developed a theoretical agent-based 
model in which different institutional (i.e., 
voting mechanisms) and environmental 
(i.e., spatial heterogeneity) settings affect 
the interaction among wine geographical 
indication (GI) stakeholders through an 
endogenous institutional change process. 
Farms behave as a cooperative system and 
use a common GI label that grants higher 
returns. In the model, farm agents can 
endogenously change one common 
operational rule through voting. The rule 
they can amend is a production constraint 
(i.e., a quality standard). Wine quality is 
directly connected to climate, and climate 
change impacts farms’ ability to respect the 
standard, use the GI label and achieve 
higher premia. The outcome of the 
endogenous institutional change process, 
therefore, could affect the system’s climate 
resilience. 
The model allows testing different impact 
scenarios driven by two exogenous climate 
change processes and different institutional 
and environmental settings.  
As a theoretical model, it can be used to 
explore general system dynamics employing 
illustrative data representative of an average 
GI wine production system in the EU. 
Therefore, the aim is not to describe or 
predict any real-life setting. However, it 
might provide interesting theoretical 
insights on the role of institutional change 
in climate adaptation and resilience of 
agricultural production systems, 
contributing as a starting point for future 
research and model development. 
I.i.b For whom is 
the model 
designed? 
The model is designed for researchers to 
contribute to future model development and 
study endogenous institutional change and 




I.ii.a What kinds 
of entities are in 
the model? 
 Human agents:  farms 
 Institutional agent:  
GI board (representing a quality control 
and marketing collective agent).  
Appendix 1     
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 Spatial units (grid-boxes of a regular 
square lattice)  
I.ii.b By what 







 “minElevation” and “maxElevation”: 
Set to 0 and 800m. 
 “minSoilQ” and  
“maxSoilQ” [0, 1]. 
 “avgGStemp”: Average growing season 
temperature. 
 “optGStemp”: Optimal growing season 
temperature. 
 “climateW”: Set to 0.6. Weight of 
microclimate in the definition of wine 
quality. 
 “wineYield” Set to 50 Hl/ha. 
 “stdWinePrice”: Set to 1€. Standard 
wine price. 
 “everyXyears”: Set to 5. How often the 
institutional change process is initiated 
(in years).  
 “qualityDelta”: Set to 0.01 (i.e., 1%). 
The marginal change to the quality 
standard achievable in each institutional 
change process. 
 “basBrandValue”: Minimum collective 
brand value affecting GI prestige. 
STATE VARIABLES 
 “qualityStandard”: Initially set as 
minimum wine quality of all farms. 
 “colBrandValue”: Collective brand 
values, a stock variable of the intangible 
capital the GI board invests in each year. 
 “giPrestige”: A 0 - 4 scale integer 
variable affecting GI wine price. 
 “giWinePrice”: Premium GI wine price 
increasing in levels with “giPrestige” 




(defined as globals but directly affecting 
farms’ behaviour) 
 “memory”: (Set to five). Defines how 
far farms can look into the past (in years) 
to make decisions in the institutional 
change process and the 
acquisition/abandonment of plots.  
 “precision”: (Set to 2). Defines how 
sensitive farms are to perceive their own 
change in quality (e.g., 1 means they can 
notice a variation of 10% and 2 of 1%). 
 “radius”: (Set to 3). An indicator of 
farms’ mobility. It defines how far they 
can search in their neighbourhood to buy 
new plots. 
STATE VARIABLES  
 Location (x-y coordinates) 
 “myPlots”: Farm’s land endowment. 
 “myQuality”: Farm’s average quality. 
 “capital”: Stock variable. 
 “profit”: Each year’s profit. 
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 “pastVintages”: List average quality of 
past vintages (memory). 
 “pastProfits”: List of past profits 
(memory). 
 “plantingRights”: Allow the farm to 
buy a new plot for viticulture. 
 “ballot”: It expresses the farm’s specific 
decision in the collective choice situation 
(institutional change process).   
 
GI Board:  
PARAMETERS 
(defined as globals but directly affecting GI 
board’s behaviour) 
 “%fee”: (Set to 0.1). Fixed percentage 
fee collected from farms revenues.  
 “delta”: (Set to 0.5). Percentage of 
revenues invested in marketing to 
increase collective brand value.  
 “rho”: (Set to 0.4). Intangible capital 
(collective brand value) depreciation 
rate. 
STATE VARIABLES 
 “giRevenue”: Revenue generated by 
fees collected from farms. 
 “mktExp”: Expenditure in marketing in 
year t (in euros). 
 
Spatial units:  
PARAMETERS 
 “elevation”: in metres. 
 “soilQ”: [0, 1]. Soil quality. 
 “slope” [0, 1]. Slope in %. 
 “fixCost”: (Set to 2500 €/ha). Fixed cost 
of maintaining a plot. 
STATE VARIABLES 
 “microclimate”: Average GS 
temperature of plot i in time t.  
 “wineQ” [0, 1]. Weighted function of 
soil quality and microclimate. 
 “ageVines”: Age of the vines. 
 “fallow”: Boolean indicating if the plot 
is left fallow. 
 “owner”: Plot’s current owner. 
 “pastOwners”: List of past owners of 
the plot. 
 “varCost”: [2000, 20000] (€). Function 
of slope and related to labour costs per 
hectare. 
 “prof”: Expected profit for the plot. 
 “giLabel”: Boolean indicating if the 
quality standard is respected (i.e., plots’ 
quality ≥ standard). 
 “landPrice”: [0, 70000] (€). Function of 
quality and GI label. 
 
I.ii.c What are the 
exogenous factors 
/ drivers of the 
model? 
 Climate change:  
Two levels (+2°C and +3°C);  
 Voting mechanisms:  
Three levels (no-vote, absolute and 
relative majority).  
 Landscape heterogeneity:  
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Two levels.  
(Heterogeneous - sigma = 1.5   
and homogeneous - sigma = 3).  
 
Other parameters significantly affect the 
model dynamics but are kept constant (e.g., 
optimal GS temperature, quality delta, 
precision, and memory). 
I.ii.d If applicable, 
how is space 
included in the 
model? 
Farms are located on a two-dimensional 
grid. Each grid cell corresponds to one 
hectare with different soil, altitude and 
slope. Spatial heterogeneity impacts final 
wine quality and production costs. Farms 
have limited mobility in finding new 
suitable plots. 
I.ii.e What are the 
temporal and 
spatial resolutions 
and extents of the 
model? 
Yearly time steps, 50 years simulations. 
100 x100 regular square lattice (10km x 
10km), each grid cell representing 1 ha 




I.iii.a What entity 
does what, and in 
what order? 
1. Environmental change:  
An external climate change process 
updates microclimate and wine quality in 
each grid cell.  
 
2. Operational situation: 
a. Following simple heuristics, farms 
calculate their average quality and make 
decisions on land use (set unprofitable 
plots fallow), sell their wine output, and 
can buy or sell plots substituting low- 
with high-quality ones.  
b. The GI board reshape the GI area, 
assigning the GI label to plots that 
achieve the quality standard. Then, it 
collects a yearly fee from farmers, of 
which a fixed percentage is invested in 
marketing to increase the value of the 
collective brand. The collective brand 
value, together with quality and 
percentage of GI farms, determines the 
GI prestige which has an effect on the 
final GI wine price. Finally, the GI Board 
calculate the GI prestige and updates GI 
wine.  
 
3. Collective Choice situation 
a. Each farm votes on how to change one 
common operational rule (quality 
standards). They vote based on the 
memory of their yield quality in the 
previous five years.  
b. Ballots are collected and the quality 
standard is changed depending on the 
voting mechanism in place.  
 
(See Appendix 1.D for a general flowchart 
of the model). 








model’s design at 
the system level or 
at the level(s) of 
the submodel(s) 
We refer to Ostrom’s Institutional Analysis 
and Development (IAD) framework 
(Ostrom 2009) with respect to the definition 
of institutions, rules and institutional 
change. The model dynamics are divided 
into two action situations as defined by 
Ostrom (i.e., an operational situation and a 
collective choice situation). 
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(apart from the 
decision model)? 
What is the link to 
complexity and the 
purpose of the 
model? 
The choice of climate change scenarios is 
inspired to IPCC (2018 sec. D). First, we 
consider a temperature increase by the end 
of the century, compared to preindustrial 
levels, of 2°C (high mitigation but still not 
enough to meet the Paris agreement). Then 
we also consider a 3°C increase 
corresponding to a slower more “cost-
effective” mitigation scenario (i.e., a 
Business As Usual (BAU) scenario) as also 
agreed by Hausfather & Peters (2020). 
 
We merely consider the effect of the 
growing-season average temperature on 
grapes’ ripening process, directly affecting 
sugar and acidity levels, which are 
important determinants of wine quality and 
also regulated in production standards. 
Ignoring specific soil and hydrological 
features of a region, it is possible to define 
an optimal temperature for the given variety 
in use  (Jones et al. 2005; Ashenfelter & 
Storchmann 2016). We use this abstraction 
to represent how climate change could 
deteriorate the potential wine quality of a 
viticultural region, and we simplify further 
by considering quality as defined in a 
continuous [0, 1] interval. 
 
In our model, we assume that a region is 
entirely controlled by a single cooperative 
which is also responsible to manage the GI 
label. In this way, we simplify reality by 
assuming that no other collective agent 
(such as GI producers’ consortial) are 
present, and each farm sells wine at the 
same price only dependent on whether it 
fulfils the GI quality standards. Thus, we 
focus on the complexity of the collective 
decision-making process (institutional 
change), and how environmental conditions 
(landscape heterogeneity) impact on 
individual and collective adaptive capacity. 
 
Finally, we draw on theoretical models and 
empirical research on collective reputation, 
collective brand value and intangible capital 
(Schamel 2009; Beckert et al. 2017; 
Fishman et al. 2018) to describe how the 
final GI wine price depends on the average 
quality achieved by the region, but also on 
the share of GI producers and the value 
invested in the collective brand (e.g., 
through advertising and other marketing 
activities). 





In the operational situation, farms can act on 
land use decisions only. They face two 
different prices depending on whether their 
average quality is higher or lower than the 
quality standard. they adapt to 
environmental changes and try to maximise 
their profit by following a simple heuristic, 
i.e., they can leave plots fallow when no 
more profitable. On the other hand, farms 
have a memory of the quality and profits 
experienced in the last five years. If they 
notice a decrease in their average quality, 
they can sell their lowest quality plot, 
acquire a planting right, and purchase a 
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higher quality plot nearby. They can also 
sell plots that were not profitable in the past 
and gradually abandon farming. No land 
market is implemented in this model (see 
submodels section). Moreover, it is assumed 
that farms always respect the quality 
standard and that the GI Board acts 
effectively in creating incentives to follow 
the rule (i.e., no moral hazard considered).  
 
The GI Board simply collects fees based on 
a fixed percentage of farms’ revenues and 
invests a fixed share of the revenue in 
marketing to increase the value of the 
collective brand, which positively affects GI 
prestige and price. The rest of the budget is 
assumed to be allocated in quality control, 
ensuring farms respect the standards, and 
for other administrative expenses. Thus, this 
agent does not make decisions, but simply 
applies a fixed rule and updates global 
variables such as the collective brand value, 
GI wine price, and GI area.  
In the collective-choice situation (i.e., 
institutional change), only farms are 
involved, where they can vote to increase, 
decrease or keep the quality standard 
constant, depending on the quality of their 
past vintages. First, they are urged to 
decrease the standard if they cannot fulfil it 
in the present time, then they if perceive a 
decreasing trend in the previous five years 
they will also vote to decrease the standard. 
On the other hand, if the trend is increasing, 
and they can sustain a higher standard, 
farms will vote to increase it, and so on.  
II.i.c Why is /are 
certain decision 
model(s) chosen? 
The decision model for farmers is a 
straightforward way of depicting profit 
maximisation and quality maximisation 
motives by controlling land-use decisions 
with a simple heuristic. However, sub-
optimal decisions cannot be excluded (see 
submodels’ section). 
 
The Institutional change process, and the GI 
Board’s action, are based on examples from 
the wine sector and literature on 
cooperatives and consortia.  
 
We focused on the process of endogenous 
change of the quality standard, and 
therefore ignored the issue of quality control 
and moral hazard, by assuming that what 
the GI board spends on quality assurance is 
sufficient to ensure farms respect the 
standards at all times.  
II.i.d If the 
model/submodel 
(e.g. the decision 
model) is based on 
empirical data, 
where do the data 
come from? 
Empirical data is only used to create a 
reasonable representation of a European 
wine GI region. Data on the average size, 
number of farms, and number of hectares of 
Europe’s GI vineyards were taken from 
EUROSTAT and used for general model 
calibration. No empirical data is used to 
calibrate any parameter affecting model 
dynamics and agents’ behaviour. 
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II.i.e At which 
level of 
aggregation was 
the data available? 
General country-specific data on EU GI 




II.ii.a What are the 
subjects and 
objects of the 
decision-making? 








Farmers make decisions on two action 
situations sequentially and by using 
different heuristics. First, they adapt to 
environmental challenges and quality 
standards, by making land-use decisions, 
while trying to maximise profit and increase 
their quality in the (lower-level) operational 
situation. Then they participate in the 
process of endogenous institutional change 
by voting in the (higher-level) collective-
choice situation. There, farms can increase, 
decrease, or keep constant the common 
quality standard. The GI Board does not 
make a real decision as discussed above.  




in the model? Do 
agents pursue an 
explicit objective 
or have other 
success criteria? 
Farms do not maximise any objective 
function, they just try their best to adapt to 
climate change by letting the least profitable 
plots follow, sell lower quality, and buy 
higher quality land. In this way, they try to 
fulfil the quality standard which allows 
higher GI premia and thus higher profits. 
II.ii.c How do 
agents make their 
decisions? 
Farms process information about past and 
present environmental variables and follow 
heuristics to adapt to environmental and 
institutional conditions. Moreover, farms 
use a simple heuristic, based on past 
experience to decide when to abandon 
farming and determine their vote in the 
collective-choice situation.  
II.ii.d Do the 





variables? And if 
yes, how? 
Every farm follows the same heuristic, both 
in operational and collective choice 
situations. However, in the first decision-
making setting, farms have two possible 
strategies. Until the average quality of their 
plots is higher than the quality standard, 
they can pool grapes from different plots 
and produce only GI wine which commands 
a higher price. Otherwise, they will start 
selling wine from each plot separately, 
producing both high-quality GI wine and 
standard wine.  
II.ii.e Do social 
norms or cultural 
values play a role 
in the decision-
making process? 
No, social norms are not included in any 
form of incentive/payoff mechanisms or 
decision making process. 
II.ii.f Do spatial 
aspects play a role 
in the decision 
process? 
Yes, a farm's location affects its behaviour 
and environmental challenges. No 
relocation of the farmstead is considered 
and farms have limited mobility in finding 
new suitable plots around them. Moreover, 
spatial heterogeneity impacts on an 
aggregate level on the institutional change 




II.ii.g Do temporal 
aspects play a role 
in the decision 
process? 
Each year temperature increases following a 
linear trend. Agents have limited memory of 
the past which affects their behaviour at 
multiple levels. The quality standard can be 
changed over a fixed time frame of 5 years 
through collective action, and affects each 
agents’ decisions. 
II.ii.h To which 
extent and how is 
uncertainty 
included in the 
agents’ decision 
rules? 
Uncertainty is not considered, temperature 
increases linearly each year degrading wine 
quality in a deterministic way. Evaluating 
their past experience farms predict that the 
same damaging climatic trend will apply in 
the future, making a correct but incomplete 
prediction. 
II.iii Learning II.iii.a Is 
individual learning 




their decision rules 
















assumed to sense 
and consider in 
their decisions? Is 
the sensing 
process erroneous? 
As exogenous state variables, individuals 
sense the present wine quality of their plots 
and plots around them which guides their 
heuristic. They also have access to other 
environmental variables such as slope and 
elevation. They keep lists of past quality 
levels and profits (memory) that play an 
important role in both operational and 
collective choice situations. Finally, the 
quality standard is endogenously defined in 
the collective choice process and it impacts 
farms’ decisions. The sensing process 
happens without systematic errors, but 
farms have a maximum precision in sensing 
wine quality and its variations over time 
(i.e.,  ≥ 1% -  to the 2nd decimal). 
Nonetheless, present wine quality is 
precisely calculated when confronted to the 
standard (i.e., to the 4th decimal).  
II.iv.b What state 
variables of which 
other individuals 
can an individual 
perceive? Is the 
sensing process 
erroneous? 
The GI Board knows the average quality of 
all plots and farms revenues to the 
maximum level of precision. 
II.iv.c What is the 
spatial scale of 
sensing? 
Global (GI Board), local (farms). 





All above-mentioned variables are just 
known by the agents. 
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explicitly, or are 
individuals simply 
assumed to know 
these variables? 
II.iv.e Are the 
costs for cognition 




in the model? 
No. 
II.v Individual 
Prediction II.v.a Which data 
do the agents use 
to predict future 
conditions? 
Data on past average quality at the 
farm’s  level is used as a predictor of future 
quality, urging them to vote accordingly on 
the emendation of the quality standard or to 
start searching for new higher quality plots. 
II.v.b What 
internal models are 
agents assumed to 
use to estimate 
future conditions 
or consequences of 
their decisions? 
Farms myopically estimate future 
environmental conditions, limited to 
understanding if their quality will 
deteriorate/improve due to climate change. 
II.v.c Might agents 
be erroneous in the 
prediction process, 
and how is it 
implemented? 
Since the climate trend is deterministically 
modelled, by checking if, let’s say, their 
quality was decreasing in the previous 
years, they correctly predict the same will 
continue in the future and try to adapt via 
land use and by pushing to decrease the 
quality standard. They access a list of 
previous quality levels and check if their 




agents and entities 
assumed as direct 
or indirect? 
Farms interact indirectly through voting on 
the quality standard. The GI board defines 
the GI area, important for individual farms 
decision making, and collects fees. 
Investing in collective brand value can 
limitedly substitute for quality, and keep 
higher premia, assuring farms economic 
viability.  
 
II.vi.b On what do 
the interactions 
depend? 
Farms’ interaction  happens every 5 years 
(exogenously defined) and involves them 
all. On the contrary, the GI board act every 
year unconditionally after the farms in the 
operational arena. 




how are such 
communications 
represented? 
No communication considered. 
II.vi.d If a 
coordination 
network exists, 
how does it affect 
the agent 
behaviour? Is the 
structure of the 







II.vii.a Do the 
individuals form 
or belong to 
aggregations that 
affect and are 
affected by the 
individuals? Are 
these aggregations 
imposed by the 




No, except for the majorities/alignments 
emerging in the institutional change process 
(i.e., those who want to increase, decrease 
and keep the quality standard constant). 
II.vii.b How are 
collectives 
represented? 
The GI Board represents a collective 
institutional agent, which acts for the 
common good of the system. However, it 
does it in autonomy from individual agents. 
Further, the way endogenous institutional 
change is modelled represents farms’ 




II.viii.a Are the 
agents 
heterogeneous? If 





Farm size can vary. Moreover, due to 
heterogeneity in environmental variables, 
affecting variable costs and quality of plots, 
depending on their location farms have 
different average quality and total costs.  




making? If yes, 
which decision 













assuming they are 
random or partly 
random? 
None, except for the environment 
initialisation (i.e., elevation and soil quality 
spatial pattern), the location of farms and 
their land endowment. However, farms are 




II.x.a What data 
are collected from 
the ABM for 
testing, 
understanding and 
analysing it, and 
how and when are 
they collected? 
Data is collected at the end of each year, 
some variables are cumulated/counting 
other are flux variables.  
 
Economic/ production data: Average and 
total capital and profits of farms, number of 
farms (total, GI and standard wine farms), 
number of bankruptcies, total output 
(standard and GI wine). Average quality 
and quality standard, collective brand value. 




Institutional change data: Percentage GI 
area of total, quality standard, voting results 
(i.e., frequency of decrease, keep constant, 
increase), successful rule emendation. 
 
Environment variables: Number of fallow 
plots, ratio abandoned vs acquired plots. 
II.x.b What key 
results, outputs or 
characteristics of 
the model are 
emerging from the 
individuals? 
(Emergence) 
The inclusion of endogenous institutional 
change led to considerable variations in all 
target variables, including the emergence of 
complex/chaotic behaviours. We showed 
how landscape heterogeneity has a twofold 
role in the climate resilience of the system. 
It increases individual adaptability but 
slows down collective adaptive capacity 
through institutional change. Considering 
absolute vs relative majority did not 
produce any relevant result. Institutional 
change results are sensitive to the memory 
parameter and extremely sensitive to the 
precision parameter.  
III. Details III.i 
Implementation 
Details 
III.i.a. How has 
the model been 
implemented? 
In the NetLogo platform (version 6.2), R 
and GIS extensions of the model are also 
implemented. 
III.i.b Is the model 
accessible, and if 
so where? 
The code is available on the GitHub page of 




III.ii.a What is the 
initial state of the 
model world, i.e. 
at time t=0 of a 
simulation run? 
A total of 680 farms located on a 100x100 
lattice environment of which elevation is 
defined randomly from a uniform 
distribution (ranging from 0 to 800 
m).  This randomly generated raster is then 
smoothed with a gaussian kernel. The same 
applies to soil quality, which ranges from 0 
to 1. A total of 1850 patches (hectares) are 
randomly assigned to the closest farm; this 
process ensures that the average farm size 
matches EU GI viticultural data (2.7 
ha/farm). Farm initial capital allows them to 
cover total production costs for the first two 
years. The initial quality standard is set as 
the minimum of farms’ average quality in 
time zero, reflecting the case in which each 
farm meets the standard. This defines which 
plot can attain the GI label and can sell wine 
at a higher price. Finally, the optimal GS 
temperature is exogenously set to match the 
average GS temperature of the region, 
meaning that the region has reached 
climatic optimality for the vine variety in 
use. 
III.ii.b Is the 
initialisation 
always the same, 
or is it allowed to 
vary among 
simulations? 
Spatial heterogeneity is exogenously set. 
Two levels for the sigma (variance) of the 
Gaussian kernel are used to smooth altitude 
and soil quality. Heterogeneous 
environment (sigma = 1.5) homogeneous 
environment (sigma = 3). These two 
settings affect initialisation, even though the 




III.ii.c Are the 
initial values 
chosen arbitrarily 
or based on data? 
Some of the variables/parameters are based 
or calibrated on aggregated data of 
European GI viticulture, such as the number 
of farms, hectares, and average farm 
size.  Others are informed guesses or 
adapted to the literature, such as average GS 
temperature, min and max elevation, 
“climateW", wine prices differences, 
“everyXyears”, “rho”. 
Other parameters are arbitrary, 
“optGStemp”, “radius”, “memory”, 
“precision”, “delta”, “%fee”, 
“qualityDelta”,  “basBrandValue”. 
III.iii Input 
Data 
III.iii.a Does the 
model use input 
from external 
sources such as 








III.iv.a What, in 
detail, are the 
submodels that 
represent the 
processes listed in 
‘Process overview 
and scheduling’? 
Environmental change (update patches’ 
temperature and quality) 
 
Farm heuristic: Set plots fallow, sell wine 
and update capital, sell low-quality plot, buy 
high-quality plot, abandon farming. 
 
GI Board action: Reshape the GI area, 
collect fees and invest marketing, update 









List of parameters in Appendix 1.C. 
III.iv.c How were 
the submodels 
designed or 










B. Full submodels’ description 
Initialisation  
A total of 680 farms is located on a 100x100 lattice environment of which elevation is 
defined randomly from a uniform distribution (ranging from 0 to 800 m).  A random raster 
is generated and then smoothed with a gaussian kernel using an R program and the R 
extension in NetLogo. The Gaussian kernel is a 9x9 matrix with a sigma of 1.5 or 3, to 
attain a relatively heterogeneous or homogeneous landscape. The same technique is applied 
to generate a raster for soil quality, which ranges from 0 to 1. These rasters are used in the 
NetLogo programme to define the environment (i.e., world). Slope data is calculated by 
performing a convolution of the elevation data frame. This time a 3x3 kernel is applied 
modifying a code sample of the NetLogo GIS extension according to this slope 
algorithm).  Once the elevation data is loaded, it is used to downscale an exogenously given 
average growing season (GS) temperature which value is set to 17°C which is a value seen 
in many viticultural regions (Jones et al. 2005). Downscaling simply follows the dry 
adiabatic lapse rate, for which temperature falls of 0.0098°C/m (9.8°C/km). Finally, the 
optimal GS temperature is exogenously set to match the average GS temperature of the 
region, meaning that the region has reached climatic optimality for the vine variety in use. 
Average GS temperature and soil quality are then used to define the potential wine quality 
for each plot (i) using equation 1 (see Figure 6).  
WineQi  =  0.4  × SoilQi  +  0.6 ×  (1 −




The choice of the weights reflects the hypothesis that microclimate is the most important 
component in the definition of wine terroir and quality together with the soil (van Leeuwen 
et al. 2004; van Leeuwen & Seguin 2006). The choice of the functional form, quadratic 
and perfectly concave, is inspired by results shown in Jones et al. (2005). This functional 
form is a plausible approximation of the relationship between wine quality and climate. 
Very close to the optimal temperature the quality variations are small, but dramatically 
increase then further it gets from the optimum up to a point in which the climate is not at 
all suitable to the grapevine variety in use. It is obviously a simplification, and different 
varieties can be more or less adaptable/susceptible to climate variation. The maximum wine 
quality (i.e., 1) is reached when a plot has the maximum soil quality of 1, and 0 percentage 





Figure 6. Wine quality given an optimal GS average temperature of 17°C and keeping a constant soil quality 
of 1. 
Farms are not located totally randomly, to avoid collocation in unrealistic places. First, the 
plots with slope lower than 25% are selected, then 1850 patches with the best wine quality 
among the first selection are used to randomly locate the 680 farms, while ownership is 
assigned to the nearest farmstead. In this way, we represent the process of optimal 
adaptation of the viticultural area to the existing environmental conditions (which is part 
of the viticultural terroir concept), vines are a perennial crop, long term investments, and 
farms do not locate randomly. Moreover, in this way we also calibrate the model to match 
EUROSTAT data on number of farms, planted hectares and average farm size in GI 
systems. Farms initial capital allows them to cover production costs for the first two years. 
The quality standard is set as the minimum average wine quality of all farms, meaning that 
at period zero, they can all respect the standard. Two different prices are exogenously given 
in the initialisation: 1 €/l for standard wine (from plots with quality lower than the standard) 
and 1.5 €/l for GI wine. This price difference reflects consumers' WTP for an institutionally 
recognised label or general regional reputation as described in Schamel (2009) or Castriota 
(2020 chap. 6). Also, wine yield is exogenously given to 5000 l/ha, a good proxy for quality 
GI in the EU. 
The total cost per hectare is given by equation 2, where FCi = 2500€ being the fixed costs 
for keeping the plot productive (including plots left fallow or with juvenile unproductive 
vines). Variable costs occur for production (applies to productive plots only) and are 
directly related to labour costs and plot’s slope following Delay, Piou and Quenol (2015). 
Given the yearly salary of 20000€, a worker can harvest 10 ha if the slope is <=10%. Then, 
harvesting becomes increasingly difficult with slope, to the point where a worker can 
harvest only 1 ha if the slope is 100%. Slope takes values in the interval [0, 1]. In this way 
we skip modelling hiring labour, and use a continuous labour cost variable per hectare (e.g., 
a plot with slope 25% requires 0.25 farmers, thus 5000 €/ha*yr)  (see Figure 7). 
 
TCi  =  𝐹𝐶 +   slopei ×  20000 (2) 




Figure 7. Variable (labour) cost per hectare increasing with slope (from 0.1 workers/ha to 1 worker/ha). 
Given the prices and yield described above, if a farm sells standard wine (pw= 1€), 
following the total revenue equation 3, it can barely cover the production costs of a plot 
with a relatively low slope of 12.5% (TC = TR = 5000 €/ha). With basic GI wine price this 
value increases to 25%. Finally, the land price is proportional to quality and is calculated 
following equation 4, with “giLabel” being a dummy variable. Official data on viticultural 
land prices is hard to find. Here we ponder a maximum price of 70000 €/ha.  
𝑃𝑖
𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑑  =  wineQi × 50000 + giLabeli × 20000 (4) 
 
Environmental change 
A linear and deterministic climate change process raises the average GS temperature of 
each plot every year. Two climate change scenarios are considered: a more optimistic 
scenario, in which temperature increases of 0.0125°C/year and a more pessimistic one of 
0.025°C/year. Since the global decadal average temperature has already increased by 1°C 
in 2020 compared to the pre-industrial level, supposed to start the model in 2020, the two 
trends would lead to a +2°C and +3°C global warming scenarios by the end of the century. 
These are in agreement with IPCC (2018), the first corresponding to a scenario with high 
emission reduction pledges, unfortunately still not in line with the Paris Agreement 
objectives, and the second a less ambitious (business as usual) mitigation scenario. After 
temperature, also wine quality is updated for each patch (equation 1). 
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Farm heuristic  
Each year, all farms follow the same heuristic, which consists of the following five phases: 
a. Set plots fallow  
First, the farm calculates the average 
wine quality of each of its productive 
plots. Productive plots are the ones that 
are not fallow and that have vines older 
than three years. The farms adopt two 
different “strategies” depending on 
whether their average quality is 
greater-equal-less than the quality 
standard. When AVG. Quality ≥ 
Quality STD., they can pool all 
production and sell wine at the higher 
GI premium from every plot (i.e., pool 
strategy). In the opposite case, they can 
split production and sell both GI and 
standard wine separately from low- and 
high-quality plots (i.e., mixed strategy) 
(see figure 8). Leaving a plot fallow is 
the only way farms can avoid paying its 
production costs (i.e., variable labour 
costs).  
In both strategies, if the expected profit of one plot is less than - 2500€ (i.e., fixed costs of 
keeping plot fallow) they will decide to set the plot fallow. Moreover, at the beginning of 
every year the farm checks if the quality level of fallow plots is higher than the standard to 
bring them back into production, which might happen to high elevation plots where 
temperature is too low at an early stage or when the quality standard is reduced. If the farm 
has no productive plots, they just update their capital by bearing the total costs (e.g., it 
happens when they plant new vines which are unproductive before they are productive, see 
phase d). This heuristic follows the logic of profit maximisation, even though sub-
optimality cannot be excluded. 
b. Sell wine and update capital 
Farms collect their harvest, sell the wine to the respective prices and update their capital. 
This is to simplify the model since the vinification process takes time, and it is common 
for high-quality wine to be aged in barrels for two to three years. We also assume farms 
have no access to credit; thus, if they cannot cover production costs, they exit the business. 
Figure 8. Flow chart of set plots follow heuristic. 
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There is no real market for wine, all production is assumed to be sold at given prices. To 
conclude the module farms update vine age (see module d) and a list of past wine quality 
of the harvest and profits. 
c. Sell plot  
First it is important to clarify that no land market is modelled here, each plot is simply 
assumed to be free when no farm owns it, thus can be bought at the price defined by 
equation 4. On the other hand, plots that are no longer profitable or suitable, can be sold 
and simply become available to other purposes (no viticulture). 
Farms can adopt a long-term adaptation measure and can buy one new higher quality plot 
per year. To do so, they must sell one of their plots and pull out the vines to attain a planting 
right. New vineyards’ installations are strongly regulated in the EU and can reach a 
maximum of 1% of the total planted area each year (Pomarici and Sardone, 2020). To avoid 
dealing with the formation of a planting rights market, we assume that a new plot can only 
be cultivated if a farmer renounces another plot. 
This strategy is applied when farms perceive their average quality has decreased over the 
previous five years (farm’s memory) and a potential new plot is available nearby (radius 
of 3 patches). Then farms select the lowest quality plot, sell it, and eradicate the vines. They 
are also able to sense if the plot is downhill or uphill, selecting one with an elevation lower 
than the average value of their land. In this way, they avoid selling high elevation plots at 
early stages, keeping them as a “future asset”. The farmstead plot is not included in this 
selection. Thus, an equilibrium is reached when the lowest quality plot at the lowest 
elevation is where the farmstead is located. In this case, the farm has no plot to sell and 
cannot acquire new ones. 
d. Buy new plot 
When farms sell a plot, or have a planting right from previous years, they can buy a new 
plot and plant vines on it. They search for a free and most profitable field (max π > 0) with 
quality higher than the quality standard in a radius of 3 patches from the farmstead. They 
also avoid plots which they already owned in the past, to avoid they continuously sell and 
buy the same plot. The vines’ age is set to 0; they age each year after the farm sells wine 
and stay unproductive for three years. Juvenile vines still produce fixed costs of 
maintenance of 2500 €. The average vines’ age in each plot does not get above 20 years. 
Despite being an arbitrary value, it means we assume that the vineyard is maintained at an 
optimal age level. Thus, we can ignore vines’ life cycle and substitution of old vines.  
In the end, capital and planting rights state variables are updated. Following points a, c and 
d, farms strive for a higher quality, trying to adapt to environmental conditions and keep 
up with the quality standard while maximising their profit. 
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e. Abandon farming 
Finally, using a list of past profits, if farms have registered negative profits in the previous 
five years, they will sell the least profitable plot in the same way as in point c. When they 
have no other plot left than the farmstead plot, the farm agent perishes (i.e., farm exit).  
GI Board action 
a. Fees’ collection and Marketing investment 
First, the GI Board reshapes the GI area, checking which patches have quality higher than 
the quality standard and thus defining which patch gets the GI label (important information 
for farms heuristic since it defines plots profitability and land prices). It collects a fixed 
share (10%) of total farms’ revenues. Half of the total GI board revenue is assumed to be 
spent to finance the process of quality controls, definition of the GI area and other 
administrative costs assumed exogenous. As we described earlier, there is no moral hazard 
in the model, and we assume that the GI board makes farms comply to the standard. The 
other half of the revenue is spent in an endogenous process of brand value creation. The 
Board invests in marketing (“mktExp”) to increase the collective brand value (“CBV”), a 
form of intangible capital which behaves following a standard capital accumulation 
function (equation 5). The value of the collective brand depreciates fast, by 40% each year 
(ρ = 0.4), following literature on intangible capital (Corrado et al. 2020), therefore the 
system must produce high returns to increase this value. The GI board makes no profits 
(i.e., all revenues are invested in quality checks and marketing).  
 
CBV𝑡 =   CBV𝑡−1  +  mktExp − ρ ∗ CBVt−1  (5) 
 
b. GI prestige function 
Finally, the Board updates the GI prestige level, which directly affects the final GI wine 
price. The GI prestige is a form of collective brand reputation, and it is represented by a 
five-level function depending on three variables: the collective brand value, average wine 
quality from productive GI plots, and the percentage of farms producing GI wine (i.e., 
farms that have at least one plot producing GI wine). These three variables are divided in 
five levels/intervals as Table 1 shows. Importantly, we set an arbitrary minimum value 
of collective brand value (named “basBrandValue” or “bbv”) of 1000000 € to define the 
levels. 
Table 1. (These tables are not numbered because already described in the main document)  
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
GI quality < 0.5 [0.5,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) > 0.9 
Collective brand 
value 








% of GI farms < 0.5 [0.5,0.7) [0.7,0.8) [0.8,0.9) > 0.9 
70 
 
The average level of the three variables is rounded to the closest integer value and used as 
the GI prestige level. Increasing prestige level ensures a higher GI wine price as in Table 
2. Level 0 corresponds to the standard wine price.  
Table 2. (These tables are not numbered because already described in the main document) 
GI prestige Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4 
GI wine price 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 
It is important to underline that the following framework is the result of modeller arbitrary 
choices. Both variables and the intervals set here have an important impact on the final 
outcome. The three variables affecting collective brand reputation (prestige) are inspired 
by theoretical literature of collective brand reputation and empirical studies on consumers 
willingness to pay (WTP) for wine. For Schamel (2009), the average quality of all 
producers in a region can be regarded as the collective reputation of that region, consumers 
will compare regional producers based on that information. He shows that the effect of 
region of origin on final wine price is a composition of regional brand and collective 
reputation value. We try to capture these two components by using the average quality of 
GI producers, and the collective brand value. Since we are in the experience goods domain, 
consumers will inform themselves on the prior average performance of the region to 
determine their WTP. For simplicity, we take only the most recent quality level into 
account (current year quality), even though an average value of past vintages might be more 
appropriate for future studies.  
Differently from Schamel (2009), we are modelling a hypothetical region in which all 
producers are united under the same umbrella cooperative, and cannot invest in their own 
brands. Therefore, it makes sense to ignore the conflict between regional brand and 
individual brand reputation. Schamel shows that in regions with high quality, regional 
brands become less important compared to individual brands, which can be explained by a 
higher level of quality-based competition among producers. 
Quality is important, but it is not the only element affecting consumers WTP. Beckert et 
al. (2017) demonstrate how other symbolic characteristics of wine can explain wine price 
differences (e.g., artistic components, terroir, regional history). All these characteristics 
are part of the symbolic capital of a region and can be communicated to the public by 
investing in marketing and advertising, capitalising in the collective brand value. 
Finally, in a theoretical model, Fishman et al. (2018) show that in strict quality control 
collective brand settings, the number of producers can increase consumers' WTP, since 
they have more information (reducing uncertainty) about past quality compared to private 
brands. Following this logic increasing the share of GI producers in the region can have a 
positive effect on its prestige and final price.  
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The underlying idea is that a region can partially substitute average quality by consistently 
investing in other forms of intangible/symbolic capital embodied in the collective GI brand 
through marketing. Other than increasing total returns, the number of GI farms can also 
increase the signal provided to consumers. Other effects of production volume on price are 
not considered, even though they might be substantial. On the other hand, we also ignore 
any chance of product differentiation (e.g., creation of reserves and special selections). 
Endogenous institutional change (collective-choice situation) 
The quality standard can be endogenously amended by farms that can vote to keep it 
constant, increase, or decrease it. The delta variation achievable in each institutional change 
process is exogenously set to 1%. Institutional change is initiated every five years, a 
reasonable estimate for a long and centralised bureaucratic process. First, farms are urged 
to decrease the standard when they can no longer fulfil it in the current period. Then, they 
also check the average wine quality achieved in the previous five years (exogenously set 
memory). When their average quality is decreasing, they vote to lower the standard, while 
in the opposite case they vote to increase it only if they can still respect the higher standard. 
When no trend is shown in the previous years, farms will vote to keep the standard constant. 
Farms check trends by simply comparing the 5-year average quality with the present one. 
They can sense quality variations in the order of 1%, defined by the “prec” (precision) 
parameter through which quality variables are rounded. With the process described above, 
a farm-specific state variable called “ballot” is updated with value 1 (increase) -1 (decrease) 
or 0 (keep constant). Then ballots are collected on a list called “ballot-box”. Votes are 
counted and then depending on the exogenously defined voting mechanism the final 
decision is taken. The ballot box is then emptied at the end of the process.  
C. List of models’ parameters6 
 
"dimKernel" = 9 
"maxSoilQ" = 1 
"minSoilQ" = 0 
"minElevation" = 0 
"maxElevation" = 1000 
"avgGStemp" = 17 
"optGStemp" = 17 
"climateW" = 0.6 
"nFarms" = 680 
"totArea" = 1850 
“wineYield” = 5000 
“stdWinePrice = 1” 
“giWinePrice = 1.5” 
“fixCost = 2500” 
"radius" = 3 
"memory" = 5 
"prec" = 2 
"everyXyears" = 5 
"qualityDelta" = 0.01 
"%fee" = 0.1 
"delta" = 0.5  
"rho" = 0.4 
"basBrandValue" = 1000000 
 
                                                 
6 See ODD + D protocol for description. 
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Figure 14. Distribution of main outcome variables at the end of the simulation (period 55). 
 
Appendix 3 
